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A futures market is considered to be efficient when the futures prices forecast the future spot 
prices perfectly. The weak form of Efficient Market Hypothesis holds when the difference 
between the prices is zero on average based on historical prices. Then the futures price can be 
said to be an unbiased estimate of the future spot price. The existence of a risk premium does 
not necessarily lead to the rejection of the efficiency hypothesis but unbiasedness does not hold 
anymore. The efficiency in the coffee futures market is studied in this thesis. The agents in the 
coffee markets would benefit from the forecasting ability of the futures prices so that it would 
provide information on the highly variable future coffee price behaviour. The price fluctuation 
is caused by the slow adjustment of the production to the prices and it complicates the 
economic planning of the agents. This would be especially important for the developing 
countries which produce almost entirely the world's coffee supply. 
 
The prices on the coffee markets, which are the futures and spot markets, are studied in this 
thesis by using econometric methods. A considerable attention is focused on the direction of 
the causality as a support of the possible forecasting ability. Vector autoregressive models and 
vector error correction models are used to model the price discovery, in other words the 
common movement of the spot and the futures prices. The results of the empiric part are 
contradicted which implies that neither of the prices leads the coffee market price discovery. 
Hence, the hypothesis that the futures prices transfer information to the spot market does not 
receive support in the case of coffee. The simultaneous and parallel movement of the spot and 
the futures prices is likely caused by the fact that both prices react to the same information. If 
cointegration is accepted as a relation between the futures price and the future spot price, can 
the risk premium be interpreted from the results. According to these results the investors are 
risk averse when the futures price is determined close to the maturity and risk takers when the 
long before the maturity. 
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Futuurimarkkinoiden tehokkuuden merkkinä pidetään futuurihintojen täydellistä ennustavuutta 
tulevaisuuden spot-hintojen suhteen. Tehokkaiden markkinoiden heikko muoto vallitsee 
tilanteessa, jossa hintojen erotus on keskimäärin nolla menneiden hintojen perusteella. Tällöin 
futuurihinnan voidaan sanoa olevan harhaton estimaatti tulevalle spot-hinnalle. Riskipreemion 
olemassaolo ei välttämättä johda tehokkuushypoteesin hylkäämiseen, mutta harhattomuus ei 
enää päde. Tässä opinnäytetyössä tutkitaan kahvifutuurimarkkinan tehokkuutta. 
Kahvimarkkinan osapuolet hyötyisivät futuurien ennustuskyvystä siten, että suuresti 
vaihtelevan kahvin hinnan tulevaisuuden käyttäytymisestä saataisiin informaatiota. Vaihtelun 
syynä on tuotannon hidas sopeutuminen hintoihin, ja se hankaloittaa markkinaosapuolien 
talouden suunnittelua. Erityisen tärkeää tämä olisi kehitysmaille, jotka tuottavat melkein 
kaiken maailman markkinalla myytävän kahvin. 
 
Kahvimarkkinoiden eli futuuri- ja spot-markkinoiden hintoja tutkitaan tässä opinnäytetyössä 
ekonometrisillä menetelmillä. Huomiota kiinnitetään kausaliteetin suuntaan mahdollisen 
ennustuskyvyn tukena. Vektori autoregressiivisia malleja ja vektori virheenkorjausmalleja 
käytetään mallintamaan spot- ja futuurihintojen keskinäistä liikettä markkinatasapainon 
löytämiseksi. Tutkimusosion tulokset ovat keskenään ristiriitaisia, mikä viittaa siihen, että 
kumpikaan kahvimarkkinoista ei selkeästi johda hinnanmuodostusprosessia. Näin ollen väite 
futuurien roolista informaation siirtäjänä spot-markkinalle ei saa tukea kahvin tapauksessa. 
Spot- ja futuurihintojen yhtäaikainen ja yhdensuuntainen liike on todennäköisesti seurausta 
saman informaation käytöstä. Jos yhteisintegraatio hyväksytään relaatioksi futuurihinnan ja 
tulevaisuuden spot-hinnan välille, voidaan tuloksista tulkita riskipreemiota. Näiden tulosten 
perusteella sijoittajat ovat riskiaversiivisia silloin, kun futuurihinta muodostetaan lähellä 
futuurin elinajan päättymistä, sekä riskinottajia silloin, kun futuurin elinaika on pitkä. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the world's most traded commodities is coffee. The coffee market is divided into two 
parts, the spot market and the futures market. The physical product, coffee, is traded on the 
spot market. Futures market is also used for the trading the physical commodity but a large 
part of the contracts are used for hedging. That means that the futures contracts agree only on 
the exchange of money at expiration based on the difference of the futures price and the spot 
price at the delivery date. Hedging is protecting investments against price fluctuation (price 
risk) with financial derivatives. Historically, the coffee price has been volatile both in the 
short-term and the long-term. The uncertainty about the future spot price is inconvenient for 
the market participants since it is difficult to plan the future when the future income and costs 
are uncertain. For some market participants the price risk is difficult to bear. For example, for 
the small farm producers it may be even fatal if the price sinks low enough. In addition to the 
individual farmers, the people in the producer countries, the employees in catering business 
in the consuming countries and the middlemen in the coffee industry are dependent on the 
fluent functioning of the coffee markets through the system of national economic circulation. 
According to the International Coffee Organisation (2010b), the value of the coffee exports of 
the crop year 2009/10 was 14.3 billion US dollars. The failure of such a big market might 
have a serious effect on the world economy. 
 
Futures market provides a tool for transferring the risk and assessing the future prices. Yet, 
they may not be working as well as hoped. For example, the effect of the futures contracts on 
the spot price volatility is inconclusive. Some say that the futures have decreased the 
volatility; others say that it is a possible source of volatility. Another is that those who would 
most benefit from using the futures markets, the producers in developing countries, may not 
have sufficient knowledge of how to use futures contracts for hedging or have access to them. 
They could, however, use the information of the futures prices if the futures price could 
predict the future spot price level at least partially. 
 
One of the interests in the futures market research is market efficiency. It is divided in two 
parts: the unbiasedness hypothesis and the prediction hypothesis. The former claims that the 
futures prices are exact forecasts of the future spot prices as they reflect the market 
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expectations. The latter claims that the futures prices can explain the future spot prices at 
least partly. Even though the prediction hypothesis does not fulfil the conditions of strict 
efficiency, it is an indication of the information flow from the futures prices to the spot price 
and provides a foundation for individual forecasts. The realisation of either of the 
hypothesises would ease the task of predicting the future income and expenditure. The futures 
market efficiency differs from the traditional Efficient Market Hypothesis in the sense that it 
requires the past futures prices to equal the future spot price in which case there would be no 
arbitrage possibilities.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to present the grounds on which the commodity futures 
research is based on and to empirically test whether the efficiency hypothesis is realised in 
the coffee market. Both unbiasedness and predictability are tested at the same moment. In 
addition, the causality between the futures prices and the spot price is examined in order to 
create a picture of the coffee market price discovery. The research questions are: Does the 
coffee futures price explain the spot price, how much does the futures price explain the future 
spot price, how long is the forecast horizon of significant futures prices, is there a risk 
premium in the futures or spot market and how is the market equilibrium achieved in the 
coffee market. Despite the numerous studies in the field of commodity futures, these 
questions remain open. The results are contradicted and differ according to the commodity 
underlying the futures contract, commodity properties and econometric methods. Coffee 
futures studies  
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents the basic concepts and developments in 
the futures market. Chapter 3 presents the coffee industry and the conditions in which the 
market functions. The theoretical base for the futures market efficiency is presented in 
chapter 4 as well as the corresponding econometric models. The data that is used in the 
estimation is presented in chapter 5 and the estimation results in chapter 6. The results and 
some the theoretical points are discussed in chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes the findings of 
this thesis. The abbreviations are explained in the text but the reader can find them also in 
appendix 1. 
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2 FUTURES MARKETS IN THE FIELD OF FINANCE 
 
2.1 Basic Concepts in the Futures Markets Research 
 
A futures contract is an exchange-traded financial derivative in which two parties agree to 
trade the underlying asset at a later date for a fixed price. The maturities vary from a month to 
over a year. The delivery takes place at expiration but the contract can be sold before that. As 
other derivatives, the price of the future contract depends on the price of the underlying asset. 
The futures prices are quoted on the futures markets and the underlying assets' price are 
quoted on the spot markets. Spot market is a liquid asset market where assets are traded at 
once for the current price which the market mechanism has determined. This current price is 
called the spot price. In general, futures trading does not involve transporting the goods 
before maturity. Actually, there are futures that do not aim at delivery at all. That means the 
parties agree to count only the cash flow at the expiration. The commodity stays with the 
seller.  
 
Futures are based on an underlying asset. The asset can be another security, an index or a 
measure of performance. Nowadays the most popular assets are financial assets, such as 
stocks, bonds, other derivatives, currencies, interest rates and stock indices. However, 
commodities were the first underlying assets of future, and commodity futures are still major 
instruments in the derivative market. Other underlying assets are for example weather and 
company investments. Some of these are not really assets but can still be used as an indicator 
of the circumstances that affect the economy. This is why an asset does not describe well the 
object in the derivative contract anymore. The word ‗underlying' is used hereafter to refer to 
the term 'underlying asset'. 
 
Forward contracts are similar to futures but they are more unique than futures and are traded 
only over the counter. Over-the-counter (OTC) markets are private so the market information 
is not public and buyers and sellers trade through an intermediary. Buyers and sellers have to 
be searched separately for each security which might lead to high transaction costs, and yet, 
the process might be rather slow. Exchanges define standard terms for the securities they 
trade. Trading is easier if the public is familiar with the security's characteristics and content 
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because they can compare it with other similar securities and evaluate their true economic 
value. For the owners this means that the security can be sold rather easily if prices develop 
inconveniently. Therefore futures have more liquidity than forwards and are less subject to 
transaction costs. 
 
Futures markets are partly defined through derivative markets because they share some 
characteristics. Chance and Brooks (2010, p.13) define the purpose of derivative markets as 
follows: 
 
‘Derivative markets provide a means of managing risk, discovering prices, reducing costs, 
improving liquidity, selling short, and making the market more efficient.’ 
 
Derivative markets function as a part of financial markets but they are not traditional markets 
in the sense that they do not create or loose assets. In the asset markets, asset values can 
increase or decrease depending on the market price changes, which is a source of value 
creation. Derivative markets transfer risk to other parties willing to assume that risk. When 
the risk occurs, one party wins and the other looses. Derivatives trading could be viewed as 
gambling. Technically it is gambling. The investor who participates in a derivative contract 
has to guess something about the future price change. The return is based on how good this 
guess was, i.e. who well does the future market price match the investors guess. There are, 
however, a few reasons that set gambling apart from derivatives trading. First, pure gambling 
involves taking subjective risk which cannot be observed. In the derivatives markets, there 
are mostly professionals who know the risks they are taking for example by studying 
historical data and the fundamentals behind the underlying asset. Significant losses are most 
probable to occur when people who know little of derivatives operate in the derivatives 
markets. That is why it is important to know the fundamentals of finance and derivatives to 
be able to really understand the risks. Second, most traders are hedgers who want to transfer 
risk away. Although speculators assume this risk, they are still a minor group in the markets. 
(Chance and Brooks, 2010) 
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2.2 The Role of the Futures Markets 
 
The futures literature provides various definitions for the objectives of the futures markets. 
They vary from the simple function to provide forecasts on futures prices to a complex group 
efficiency improving objectives. Some of them are not even objectives but rather just 
consequences of the market activity. In general, the objectives of the futures markets: forward 
pricing, risk transfer, speculative trading, creation of spot markets and improving market 
efficiency. For the commodity markets, the futures facilitate storage. 
 
Firstly, forward pricing means that the future price is a guess about the futures spot price as 
the futures price is fixed for a certain date in the future. It should therefore reflect the 
market‘s expectations about the spot price development and maybe serve as a forecast in 
decision-making. Regardless of the forecasting function, the sole existence of futures 
contracts is important for the investors and producers who deal with the underlying regularly. 
By making futures contracts they are able to predict better their future cash flow. Futures 
contracts fix the price for a specific amount of underlying assets and gives valuable 
information on the future income for both parties. Thus the futures contract is similar to an 
insurance. This is what futures were originally created for - protecting investments against 
future price changes. More generally these activities can be called managing financial risk 
(the second function). Consider an investor that has investments that the value of which he or 
she wants to protect, or hedge. The asset holders and buyers might have a sense that the spot 
price changes in the future to the ―wrong‖ direction and it would be good idea to fix the price 
for this specific transaction. A futures contract is one instrument to offset the price risk, that 
is, transfer the risk to someone else. The other party who assumes this risk might have 
another kind of view of the future development of the price, and thus the futures contract 
offsets his or her risks. A speculator is willing to assume the risk even though he or she does 
not have any other investments exposed to risk and then the expected return will also be 
higher. This is third function of the futures market: provide financial instruments for the 
investors. One might consider futures contracts a good security to get capital gains. In this 
role the futures are a substitute for, or a complement to other financial instruments (Banks, 
2010, p. 227) 
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Fourthly, for some commodities, the futures markets make up the spot markets because they 
do not involve transporting at every transaction. Spot prices develop from futures prices 
during the lifetime of the futures so that the last quoted futures price at the end of the period 
is that moment's spot price. The commodities that have separate spot and futures markets will 
have also two prices but because of the law of one price, they will be the same at the futures 
expiration. The two prices converge towards each other as the maturity approaches. Thus at 
expiration the spot price is the futures price. 
 
Efficiency improvement results from different factors in the futures markets. Firstly, the 
absence of transportation at every transaction would increase the price above the assets true 
economic value. Therefore the prices would not include any extra profits for the asset owners. 
Secondly, the futures exchanges have lower trading commissions than spot markets which 
makes it less costly to trade the asset. Thirdly, futures exchanges trade only standard term 
instruments which are common to the market and thus more easily tradable. These features 
facilitate trading and thus should improve the effect of arbitrage making the market more 
efficient. 
 
The commodity futures research uses the term storage facilitation or carry-over. They both 
refer to the initial objective of the futures contracts – to distribute the supply of seasonal 
products more evenly in time and thus decrease the spot price volatility. The smaller spot 
price volatility would result also from the futures ability to transfer information to the spot 
market and the producers could adjust the production level for that price or from the spot 
price movement towards the assets true economic value as speculators try to benefit from 
arbitrage.
1
 Hart (1977) and Newbery (1987) made a remark that futures might also have 
adverse effects on spot price volatility. Futures as insurance encourage the producer to invest 
in a risky commodity, a commodity the production of which is highly stochastic and hence 
the spot price would be volatile. However, forecasting income is viewed as the most 
important objective of the futures markets and price stabilisation comes second.
2
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
    See e.g. Friedman (1953) or Cox (1976). 
2
 e.g. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) see that the the main purpose of futures markets is to stabilise income 
earnings through forecasting prices and price stabilisation is a secondary value. 
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2.3 The History of the Futures Contracts 
 
Derivatives have existed hundreds of years ago in forms we might not recognise as derivative 
contracts anymore. It is believed that futures contracts were used in India as early as 2000 
BC. Forward contracts were used in Europe in the middle ages in trade fairs where customers 
paid for the merchandise and the merchants would deliver the goods later. The same kind of 
habit developed in Japans rice market in the beginning of the 1800
th
 century.
 
(Duffie, 1989) 
 
The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) has been the major developer of the derivatives markets 
since its foundation in 1848. The first securities it started to trade were futures which were 
invented by chance. The board was initially founded to respond to a grain storing problem 
which occurred every autumn as the farmers brought their harvest for sale. Grain prices sank 
due to excess supply. CBOT created standards for grain quality and tradable quantities – and 
later a contract which agreed the farmer to deliver the grains later but the price was settled at 
once. The storage halls were not stacked anymore and farmers could expect a steady the 
future income. The buyers soon discovered that these to-arrive contracts could be sold again, 
and so a secondary futures market was born. At first the market was private but soon the 
trading started in exchanges. A clearinghouse system was created in the 1920's to secure both 
parties performance at expiration. (Chance and Brooks, 2010) 
 
Originally commodities were used as underlying asset in futures contracts. In the 1970s 
liberated exchange rates introduced the idea that financial assets could be used as an 
underlying asset as well. The first financial futures were based on foreign currencies and their 
trading on the International Monetary Market was started in 1972. Since then, new futures 
were emitted at an increasing rate until today. The most popular financial futures ever since 
have been the U.S. Treasury bond future, the Eurodollar contract and the stock index futures. 
(Chance and Brooks, 2010) 
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3 COFFEE INDUSTRY AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
 
3.1 Coffee in the World Markets 
 
Originally coffee was endemic only in Africa but the plant was transferred to other continents 
for cultivation as the demand for coffee increased in the 17
th
 century. Coffee grows in the 
tropical climate where the soil is rich and climate is warm and humid. The main coffee 
species that are traded on the coffee market are arabica (Coffea arabica) and robusta (Coffea 
canephora). Arabica is considered to be of better quality than robusta and its market centre is 
in New York. Robusta is traded on the London coffee market. (Bacon, 2008) Both species are 
grown on almost all continents but robusta is more popular in Africa and Southern Asia, and 
arabica in the Central and South Americas. (ICO, 2011a; Albrecht Llamas, 2003) 
 
Approximately 100 countries produce coffee but not all of them produce enough to export. 
During the crop season 2010/11, 44 countries exported a total of 97 millions of bags of coffee 
beans.
3
 The biggest coffee exporters, Brazil, Vietnam and Colombia, make up over 50 percent 
of the market of which the market share of the biggest exporter, Brazil, is a third. As an 
exchange-traded commodity, the market value of all coffee traded is the second largest after 
oil and an estimated 125 million people work directly within the coffee industry. (ICO, 
2011a, 2011c, 2002) Coffee is a product of the developing countries: Over 90 percent the 
production takes place in countries where the per capita gross national product (GNI) is less 
than 11 445 dollars. (OECD, 2011) 
 
3.2 The Supply of Coffee 
 
The supply of the world coffee market consists of production and stocks. The green beans can 
be stored for a period of 6 to 12 months after which they should be roasted at the latest. 
(Selmar et al., 2008) Coffee stocks work as a buffer against a sudden price rise. The recent 
price increase is suspected to be partly a result of low stocks. Sound coffee inventories are 
about 40 million bags but now they are only about 20 million bags. (Walsh, 2011) At times 
when stocks are low, consumption commodities‘ owners earn extra as the spot price 
                                                 
3
 One bag of green beans weights 60 kilograms. 
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increases. The extra profit is called convenience yield and it remunerates the asset owners for 
holding the asset when supply is lower than demand. The level of stock depends on the crop 
size of the previous season, and so a good year implicates stock decrease and vice versa. 
 
The two main factors that affect the production of coffee are plant characteristics and 
expected price. Coffee as a plant sets some conditions for the production. In addition to the 
heat and humidity requirements, coffee tree needs a rich soil. The tree begins bearing in three 
or four years after planting and will be profitable for 20 to 30 years, after which the soil is 
set-aside. (Wrigley, 1988) The time from investment to the point where it generates return is 
at least three years. After planting, the crop size depends solely on the soil and weather. 
Therefore the production in the long-term is more elastic when the price rises but inelastic 
when the prices drop. (Ponte, 2002) 
 
Indirect factors are political environment, governmental agricultural policy and barriers to 
entry. Coffee production decisions are made according to what the expected price is in the 
future. The expectations vary according to the decision-maker: at the same time one producer 
may predict that the prices increase and another may predict that they do not. There are 
different kinds of foresights of the expected price: naive, adaptive and rational expectations. 
A producer who bases the decisions on naive expectations will expect the future price to be 
the previous seasons‘ price. In the case of adaptive expectation the expected price is a 
weighted average of historical prices. Rational expectations are based on the assumption that 
the market agent considers all available information that may affect the price and thus makes 
no systematic errors in forecasts.  
 
The decision-making in the case of agricultural commodities is especially difficult because 
the producers carry two risks. The first risk is the price risk which means the spot price 
fluctuation and concerns all market agents. Coffee producers make production decisions 
before the growth season based on the expected future spot price. The time between the 
decision and harvest is substantially long and there is no guarantee that the spot price would 
converge to the expected price. The second risk is in involved in the uncertainty of 
production. Once planted, the crop size depends on the weather, disease and other random 
factors. The crop might result being smaller or bigger than expected. A small crop means less 
income for the producer if the expected price becomes the actual price. If the small crop is a 
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wider phenomenon, the aggregated supply will increase the price. (McKinnon, 1967) 
 
Political environment can have its effect in many ways, such as the governmental agricultural 
policy and international trade policy. Agricultural policy can encourage or restrict coffee 
production. Some developing countries have adopted coffee as a strategic commodity and an 
economic engine. Generally the proportion of coffee of the export of the developing countries 
is very large. However, the governments had a restrictive role in the coffee production from 
the 1960s to the 1990s. During 1962—1989 the world coffee market was regulated by the 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA) which was an agreement between the member 
countries of the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) on export quotas for producing 
countries. The objective was to keep the spot price to in a range of 1.20-1.40 US dollars per 
pound. ICA was negotiated regularly to set specific quotas for each exporting country. Only 
at times when the price rose above the upper limit, the exporting countries were allowed to 
increase their supply in order to meet the excess demand. In practise, the governments 
controlled the stocks and production by setting barriers to entry. The reason for the creation 
of this agreement was to decrease the spot price volatility which was mostly due to Brazil‘s 
attempts to manipulate the coffee market. In the early 20
th
 Brazil‘s share of coffee production 
was over two thirds. The price control settled down the market and the export revenues could 
be forecasted well. This was a good environment for other countries to develop their 
production and participate the world trade. As a result, the market became less concentrated. 
For example, Brazil‘s present day markets share declined to one third, which seems moderate 
compared with the pre-ICA time. (Ponte, 2002) 
 
In 1989 the ICO member countries did not reach an agreement anymore. The analysts see 
many reasons for the collapse of the ICA regime. First of all, there was disagreement over 
what would be suitable export quotas. Secondly, the price regime appeared to cause a free-
rider problem. Those countries that did not participate the ICA could still sell for the same 
price (or less) as the ICO producer countries. Therefore the price range was set too high and 
caused oversupply. Thirdly, initially the USA entered the ICA because it wanted to inhibit 
Brazil‘s growth to becoming a superpower during the Cold War era. Now that the threat was 
not relevant anymore, the USA preferred a free market system. (Bacon, 2008; Ponte, 2002) 
On one hand the researchers praised the ICA for its success in stabilising the coffee market 
(Ponte 2002). On the other hand they claimed that the quota system increased the price above 
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the equilibrium level (Talbot, 1997). 
 
Some researchers find futures as one factor that may increase the production (e.g. Newbery 
1987; Hart, 1977). As the future contract is a certain kind of insurance, the producer might 
feel that a part of the production and income is secured when tied to a futures contract. Thus, 
the futures contract is an incentive to invest more in the production. 
 
Because coffee is an agricultural commodity, the supply is affected by a seasonal factor. 
Close to the Equator the coffee crop is harvested twice a year and further in the tropic there is 
one crop season, the time of the year of which depends on the hemisphere. Therefore the 
world coffee market receives fresh beans constantly but the seasons create peaks in the 
supply twice a year. The increased supply lowers the prices temporarily. (Wrigley, 1988) 
 
Some fundamental problems are found in the production situated in the developing countries. 
The vast dependence on coffee export revenues is dangerous and affects the whole national 
economy, especially when the coffee prices fall. Too low market price may even lead farmers 
to bankruptcy after which the recovery of the production level takes time. The developing 
countries suffer often from conflicts that create an atmosphere of insecurity. The producers 
may even stop production in fears of the conflict spreading into the farms, and even if the 
production still continues, the infrastructure may be too deteriorated in order the coffee to be 
sold. In addition, the ratio of illiterate people is generally relatively significant and the 
educational level is low. This raises questions about how well educated are the producers to 
be able to make production decisions. Another question is, if the producers have access to the 
coffee market information. An Internet connection, telephone or newspapers are the sources 
of information but not many producers can afford them as the income is low and highly 
variable. The coffee producers in developing countries are in a weak position to participate 
the coffee market activity. 
 
3.3 The Demand of Coffee 
 
The demand for coffee is derived from the consumer demand. The producers sell the green 
beans for an international trader who sells them on to a roaster company. The roasted and 
grounded beans are sold to the retail seller. Five biggest importing countries are the USA, 
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Germany, Italy, Japan and Belgium. They buy over 50 percent of the coffee traded on the 
market.
4
 On the demand side the market has become more concentrated. In 1998, six 
companies purchased 50 percent of the green beans. The mean size of the trader company has 
grown because of the supplier-managed inventory system (SMI) that the roasters have 
adopted. SMI means that the roasters outsource the inventory management to the trader. A 
coffee trader that can ensure a steady enough supply of green beans must have vast resources 
and therefore small-scale traders are not able to compete in this environment. The growth of 
the trader companies has reduced the number of competitors in the market. (Ponte, 2002) 
 
The strongest growth in the world demand was seen in the 19
th
 century and in the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century. The total consumption does not increase significantly anymore but rather 
is diversifying in to organic, flavoured and fair trade type products. In the Americas and 
Europe, the markets are considered mature because the income elasticity of demand is rigid 
on high income levels. Coffee is also a luxury commodity because the income elasticity of 
demand is positive. The price elasticity of demand is elastic only when prices rise quickly. 
(ICO, 201; Ponte, 2002) 
 
3.4 Coffee Market Equilibrium 
 
Even though the supply and demand should lead to the market equilibrium, the coffee spot 
price is highly variable (see figure 1). It is troublesome for both the buyers and sellers: the 
buyers cannot predict their future expenses properly and the seller has to make production 
based on uncertain prediction on the futures price. Either the supply or the demand change 
constantly or there are other factors that affect the price. The price elasticities of supply and 
demand are close to 1 so they should not create short-term fluctuation. Yet, it is common that 
the supply side changes have a long-term impact on agricultural prices (Yang et al., 2001). 
The reaction time of the supply of coffee beans is two to three years after the price increase. 
As the producers make investment decisions based on current price levels, they increase the 
production at times of high prices. By the time the extra supply reaches the market, which is 
roughly two to three years after the high prices, the price has already fallen to the level before 
the price increase (as a result of a decrease in demand), and continues to decrease even more. 
                                                 
4
  According to ICO (2011a), these countries imported 51 percent of the total amount traded on the physical 
coffee market. 
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The production is difficult to reduce since the coffee plant continues to produce on its own, 
and hardly any producer would want to lose income by not selling the whole crop. The 
extremely low price forces some producers to close down their businesses. After four or five 
years the oversupply reduces and the price is on its way to the top again. This series of under- 
and overproduction causes the coffee prices oscillate in the long-term. The phenomenon has 
been known for a long time, for example H. E. Jacobs describes the phases of the oscillation 
in 1935.
5
 Gelb (1979) provides explanations about why do not the producers recognise the 
oscillation. One reason is that one cycle is long and the memory of the market is short. The 
producers have simply forgotten what happened the last time the price rose to the long-run 
high. Secondly, the stochastic nature of the price is makes it difficult to predict when does the 
trend change. Thirdly, even if the producers understood the oscillating nature of the coffee 
price, they may not have an incentive to use the futures markets for hedging. The cost of 
carry may be relatively too high so that is more profitable to sell the stock on the spot market. 
Also, at times of high prices, the opportunity cost of selling the stock on the spot market is 
low. As more assets come for sale on the spot market, the price movements become more 
sensitive.  
 
 
Figure 1. Monthly spot price (USD/pound) for arabica in the New York market from January 
1990 to September 2010 (Source: ICO 2011d). 
                                                 
5
    ‗The Saga of Coffee: The Biography of an Economics Production‘ (1935), referred to by Gelb (1979). 
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The price discovery is the process where the price adjusts to the new levels of supply and 
demand where they are in equilibrium.
6
 The market mechanism does not work well in the 
agricultural commodities markets because of the time the supply requires for the spot price to 
adjust. In a situation where the supply is predetermined and does not equal the current 
demand, the price will adapt and move away from the producer's expected price. The supply 
and demand adapting to a new price will change the equilibrium price themselves. The 
equilibrium is moving or the market is in a constant disequilibrium: There is no steady price 
where (or the steady price is out of reach) and both buyers and sellers suffer welfare loss. 
 
Let us consider a situation where the producers base the production decisions on the price of 
the previous season. If this price was high compared with long-term prices, the producers see 
that by producing more they could increase profits. Eventually the supply might exceed the 
level which is demanded for the price and the spot price starts to decrease. Producers suffer 
welfare losses because the market is not in equilibrium. The losses are not limited only to the 
situation where the supply exceeds the demand. The losses occur also when the actual trading 
price is higher than the expected price. At a higher price than expected, the producers could 
have produced and sold more and the income would have been greater. The welfare losses are 
thus directly connected to the forecast error made by the producers (Stein, 1981). 
 
Futures markets may increase the spot price volatility in two ways. Firstly, it has been 
proposed that the speculative trading affects the spot price. The professional traders that 
dominate the futures market react even to the weakest signals which may not reflect the 
actual changes in supply and demand. In case the futures lead the price discovery in the 
coffee markets, the futures price fluctuations is transferred to the spot market. (Ponte, 2002) 
Secondly, for a producer that writes a futures contract, the contract serves as insurance and 
encourages the producer to invest in a risky commodity, a commodity the production of 
which is highly stochastic. Hence there are some grounds for the futures to increase the spot 
price volatility.
7
 
 
After the ICA collapse, the spot prices fell, indicating that the ICA price regime had been set 
too high (figure 1). In addition the spot started to be more volatile compared with the ICA 
                                                 
6
    The definition follows that in Walburger and Foster (1998) 
7
 See for example Newbery 1987, Hart 1977 
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price regime. The monthly spot price has been 48 dollar cents per pound at the minimum and 
221 cents at the maximum. The two peaks in the coffee price in the 1990s were due to the 
frosts in Brazil (1994—95) and a speculative rise (1997). Since 1990, it has been buyer‘s 
market. The supply of coffee increased through the 1990s. It was mostly due to 
improvements in production technology and Vietnam‘s massive investments in the production 
of robusta. However, during the ICA regime, the roasters begun to demand minimum supply 
guarantees from the countries they purchased the coffee beans, for example in the case of 
arabica approximately 60 000 tonnes a year. This might have contributed to the increase in 
supply. The price begun to fall at the end of the 1990s and hit the bottom in 2002. The 
chronic oversupply is considered the main reason for the price decrease. (ICO, 2011; Ponte, 
2002) At the moment, there is an imbalanced competition in the coffee market, probably 
because the buyers are too few. 
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4 THEORIES OF EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMODITY FUTURES 
MARKETS 
 
This chapter discusses the efficiency in the futures markets and the two main theories. The 
theory of storage is hardly questionable. Forecasting capability and risk premium theory, on 
the other hand, have been controversial issues in the futures markets research from the 
beginning of the history of the futures contracts. Efficiency in the futures markets can be 
translated as the ability of the futures prices to forecast the future spot market prices. It is 
studied by testing two hypothesises: the unbiasedness hypothesis and the prediction 
hypothesis. Also, the econometrical methods to test efficiency are presented. The 
mathematical presentation in sections 4.1, 4.2 and partly in 4.3 and 4.4 is adapted from 
Chance and Brooks (2010). 
 
4.1 Efficiency in the Futures Markets 
 
Futures markets' efficiency has traditionally relied on agent rationality and the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH). Rationality in general means that agents understand the functioning of the 
economy and make no systematic errors when forecasting the future. Rational agents on the 
market value the assets so that the prices fully reflect the information available at that moment 
(Fama, 1970). This is the core of the EMH. It is based on three assumptions.
8
 Firstly, asset prices 
reflect the discounted future cash flow. Rational investors consider the time value of money and 
the fundamental factors that affect the returns that the asset generates. Fundamental factors are 
essential factors that affect the economy, for example supply, demand, or legislation. If the 
investors feel that the true economic value of the asset is not the same as the market price, they 
will start trading it. Arbitrage will drive the price towards the assets true economic value. 
Secondly, new information has an immediate influence on the asset prices and the prices do not 
change while there is no news. Thirdly, the new information, or 'news' occurs randomly. 
 
Futures markets research uses the implication of EMH: The prices of two assets that are perfect 
substitutes and traded on different markets must be the same. The reason is that a rational investor 
would always choose the lowest price to buy the asset and the highest price to sell it if it was 
traded on many different markets. If the two prices were different, they will converge, eventually. 
                                                 
8
 The definition follows that of Stein (1981). 
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Low prices will rise if the demand for the asset increases or supply decreases, high prices will fall 
if demand decreases and supply increases. The outcome of the arbitrage is that the prices in 
different markets will be the same and the market agents cannot profit from price differences. In 
the futures markets, these two prices are the futures price Ft,T and the future spot price ST. The 
futures price reflects information on the future spot price and fundamental value of the underlying 
commodity. If the futures price has the perfect information of the future spot price, there is 
equality between the futures price and future spot price. This is called the unbiasedness 
hypothesis. If it holds, the futures price will be an unbiased estimate of the future spot price. 
Weaker conditions allow the futures prices to have forecasting power over the spot prices. The 
prediction hypothesis argues that the futures prices provide some information of the future spot 
prices.  
 
4.2 Theory of Storage 
 
The first theory in the futures research concerned the storage of commodities and was first 
presented by Nicholas Kaldor in 1939 and later Holbrook Working in 1948 and Michael J. 
Brennan and Lester Telser in 1958 (Fama and French, 1987). Examination of price equality is 
an approach to studying market efficiency and is carried out to test the weak form of 
efficiency. Normally, the current futures price Ft,T does not equal the spot price quoted at the 
same time, St which is in contradiction with the efficient markets hypothesis. Their difference 
Ft,T – St, the basis, is studied for variability, sign and the theoretical foundation. Theory of 
storage has been a plausible explanation for this price difference so that the market efficiency 
has been accepted for this part of the futures market. It consists of the foregone interest 
return, storage costs and convenience yield. 
 
The traded asset always has an owner who expects some return for the investment, 
independent of whether the asset is a financial asset or a commodity. This return should 
always be at least the risk-free interest rate so that the net present value of the asset remains 
the same. On the futures market, the seller of the asset demands the return for the time until 
expiration, in other words the period for which the seller cannot invest the money in risk-free 
securities. The buyer of the futures contract should pay the interest return as compensation. 
Therefore the interest is added in the spot price of the asset St, so that the present value of the 
futures price Ft,T equals the spot price  St, where t is the present time and T is the moment of 
22 
 
 
expiration. They are concrete material and some of them are storable. Financial assets can be 
expressed in numbers and letters. Nowadays the information of the securities owners is stored 
in a computer hard disc which is practically costless. The seller of the futures contract has to 
store the commodity until the transaction at maturity but the warehousing and especially strict 
conditions for agricultural products are not costless. Obviously, if the commodity was sold 
right after production, there would be no need for storage. So, the price of a stored 
commodity should be higher than that of a non-stored commodity. Otherwise the seller would 
have to bear the storage costs. The risk-free interest rate and storage costs constitute the 
theory of storage. Combining the foregone interest return and the storage costs, the 
theoretical futures price is 
(1) 
 
where the storage costs are denoted by W and the risk-free interest rate by r. When the futures 
price is higher than the spot price, the market is said to be in contango. The sum of the risk-
free interest rate and the storage costs is called the cost of carry (denoted by D). Yang et al. 
(2001) suggest that instead of interest rate, the researchers should use the interest cost r(T-t) 
which is the actual foregone interest return. Because the warehousing or opportunity costs are 
proportional in (1), natural logarithm is taken from both sides 
 
(2) 
 
⇔ 
(3) 
 
Underlying assets are divided in investment assets and consumption commodities. Investment 
assets earn a known yield whereas consumption commodities do not. The latter are 
considered as inputs in production and therefore they are not held for investment purposes. It 
means that most commodities are included in this group with some exceptions, e.g. silver.
9
 
The situation is called backwardation. At times of shortages, the trader who holds the asset 
can take advantage of the situation and ask a higher spot price for the asset. This excess 
return is called the convenience yield, some kind of benefit for holding the commodity. 
                                                 
9
 Hull: p. 116: silver is actually an investment asset even though it has many industrial uses. 
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Normally, when inventories are full or almost full, the convenience yield, denoted by y, is 
zero or close to zero. There is no excess demand on the market compared to supply neither 
expectation of shortages. When there is excess demand, the spot price exceeds the futures 
price and the theoretical futures price then becomes 
 
       (3) 
 
Combining the cost of carry and the convenience yield, the theoretical futures price is 
 
(4) 
   ⇔ 
(5) 
 
The fact that the consumption commodities are inputs in productions means they have 
constant strong demand. Producers of other commodities do not like to speculate on the 
availability of the asset. They want to assure the continuing of production and are willing to 
pay a little extra. This kind of behaviour affects the spot markets so that the prices tend to 
increase in time. This tendency combined with the arbitrage conditions is called the no-
arbitrage pricing principle (equation 6) which says that the futures price could not 
theoretically be greater than the current spot price plus cost of carry minus convenience yield 
 
(6) 
 
However, all commodities are not storable and the theory of storage cannot be directly 
applied to non-storable commodities. Mainly this concerns livestock. Some argue that non-
storable commodities' futures cannot predict the future spot prices because there is no 
connection between the futures markets and the spot markets. In storable commodities 
markets the connection between the intertemporal prices is in fact storability. Others say that 
in the absence of storage possibility, the forward pricing role is enough to justify the futures 
prices contribution to price discovery. (Yang et al., 2001) 
 
 
 
ft,T+ yt = st 
ft,T
 
+ yt = st + ct 
ft,T = st + ct
 
- yt 
ft,T
 
 ≤ st + ct
 
- yt 
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4.3 Futures Prices under Uncertainty and Forecasting Ability of the Futures Prices 
 
At the moment, the most debated topic of futures market research is forecasting. Intuitively, 
futures prices should contain some information on the market expectations of the future spot 
price but the problem is, are all the expectations reflected in the futures price? The question is 
difficult to study and therefore the research is based on the assumption that the futures price 
is the market's expectation of the future spot price, mathematically presented ft,T = Et[sT]. It 
means that the futures price contains information on how much the spot price is expected to 
change. By reformulating, the equation can be presented as two differences. Reducing St 
from both sides, the left-hand side is called the basis and the right-hand side the expected 
price change 
 
(7) 
  ⇔ 
(8) 
  ⇔ 
(9) 
  ⇔ 
(10) 
 
Expectancy operator has the current time index because the expectations are based on 
information at time t (the current moment). Assuming that the futures price is the expected 
price, it is equivalent to say that the spot price is expected to change according to the 
information in the basis (equation 9). On the other hand the futures price consists of the 
current spot price plus the expected change (equation 10). The difference implies that ft,T is a 
biased estimate of the future spot price. However, futures market efficiency can only be 
examined ex-post. It is not possible to say anything about how much expectations are 
involved in the futures price, i.e. if the relation ft,T  = Et[sT] holds. 
 
Since ft = Et[sT ] is an assumption, the components of the theoretical futures price can be 
presented as follows 
 
ft,T – st = Et[sT] – Et[sT] 
ft,T
 
– st = ET[sT] – st 
ft,T – st = Et[sT – st] 
ft,T = st + Et[sT – st] 
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(11) 
  ⇔ 
(12) 
 
In fact, the expected price change can be interpreted as the cost of carry and the convenience 
yield. This implies that part of the expectations the market has is based on the theory of 
storage. The agents expect the spot price to increase by the amount of the storage costs, 
interest rate and convenience yield. Expectations are also based on the fundamental factors, 
such as the supply and demand of the underlying commodity. For example, the agents on the 
market know that the inventories of agriculture products are at the lowest just before harvest. 
So the expectations for spot prices after harvest are lower than before harvest. 
 
The assumption of the futures price being the market's expectations is strong but simplifies 
the theory. The grounds of this assumption are found by considering the uncertainty and why 
market participants make guesses about the future. Since ft,T is the amount of money the 
seller receives from the buyer at time T. They both compare the futures price to what they 
expect the future spot price to be. The seller will make a guess of the future spot price as well 
as he can and bases his bid on it. The guess has to be considered thoroughly so that with 
every probability the futures price would not be less than the spot price at maturity. 
Otherwise the decision to sell futures has created income loss for the seller. On the other hand 
the buyer would not enter into a futures contract unless he believes that the spot price will 
rise. He makes a guess about the future price and the more accurate guess, the more probably 
it occurs. The buyer can benefit from the spot price increase in two ways. An investor can 
profit from the sole price increase and receive capital gains. A company that uses the 
commodity as an input can save in costs using futures. So there is an incentive for both 
parties to guess well about the future price and it is revealed in the futures price. 
 
Expectations are individual and hidden. Therefore they are not observable. Econometrical 
study of forecasting power is ex-post examination of the equality between the observed 
future spot price and the futures price before maturity, ft,T = sT.  Equality between these 
prices means that the futures prices are unbiased predictors of futures spot prices which is a 
   Et [sT] = st + Dt – yt 
  Et[sT – st] =  Dt – yt 
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sign of efficiency on futures markets (the unbiasedness hypothesis). Clearly, the prices do not 
always equal and it is not necessary. Weak form of efficiency (of the EMH) demands that the 
difference of futures and spot prices is zero on average based on past prices. (Kebede, 1993) 
The expected value should be approximately zero, so that 
 
(13) 
 
where the It is the information the market has at t. If the futures price equals the future spot 
price, the prices have changed according to the expectations in the future price. At maturity, 
the futures and spot prices are equal. 
 
(14) 
 
This is trivial. Future price fT,T is a price settled at time T for a transaction to be made an 
instant later, at time T. For example, a trader buys a December futures on December 1st. Then 
he is able to buy the underlying at once. The time between the purchase of the futures 
contract and the purchase of the underlying is minimal. Now, fT,T can be thought of as a price 
determined and delivered at the same moment, which is the spot price by definition. On the 
other hand, fT,T and sT are prices for the same underlying on different markets at the same 
time. The central statement of EMH is that those prices have to be the same or else there are 
arbitrage opportunities.  
 
Our interest is on the difference between a futures price before maturity and a spot price at 
maturity. Even if the unbiasedness hypothesis does not hold, the futures prices may have 
some forecasting power (the prediction hypothesis). It means that markets use the available 
information fully to participate the spot price discovery (Goss, 1983, 1986). Since there are 
many futures prices to compare with one spot price at maturity, time index t is replaced with 
T-x, where x is the time difference in question (equation 15). 
 
(15) 
 
A difference deviating from zero is not unusual. There are at least three explanations for the 
 sT = fT 
E [sT
  
– ft,T
 
| It
 
] = 0 
sT – fT-x,T  
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difference: Informational forecast error, imperfect market environment and theory of risk 
premium. Firstly, informational forecast error can be interpreted as inability to predict the 
future. Information accumulates as time passes on. Future spot prices contain more 
information than the earlier quoted futures prices. If the future spot price sT has a value 
different from the futures price fT-x,T, then it contains information that the market did not 
have when fT-x,T was determined. The price change had to have been unexpected (Sheffrin, 
1996). If the value depended only on the amount of information, futures prices would never 
be able to predict future prices due to lack of information. Beck (1994) argues that the 
informational error might result because the market agents are inefficient processors of 
information. Secondly, market imperfections are claimed to affect the forecasting power. 
Chinn and Cobion (2010) say that low trading volume and thin market are factors that 
deteriorate the connection between the futures and spot markets. For example, if there were 
just few traders on the market, they might be able to affect the spot price so much that the 
prices would not reflect the past expectations included in the futures price. Thirdly, under 
uncertainty, decision-makers often demand compensation for the risk they take. The positive 
difference of equation (15) can be thought of as a reward for the investor for carrying the 
risk. The Risk premium theory is discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
In addition, there has been discussion whether storability affects the forecasting power (see 
e.g. Garbade and Silber, 1983; Fama and French, 1987; Deaves, 1995; Yang et al., 2001). The 
commodity market literature refers to some commodities as 'storable' and others as 'non-
storable', indicating that the storability would be a dichotomous variable. Storability means 
that the commodity can be stored and it preserves the quality so that it can be traded later.
10
 
Storability has been seen as the link between the futures and spot prices in the commodity 
markets (Yang et al., 2001). The argumentation for this is that the two prices participate price 
discovery of each other through storage (for example, the commodity can be sold later if the 
seller thinks the spot price has been too low). However, there does not seem to be any 
definition or an approximation for the minimum preservation time for a 'storable' commodity, 
nor is there strong empirical evidence of the argument. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Commodities are assumed to be stored according to the special requirements regarding for example 
temperature, air quality and physical state. 
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4.4 Risk Premium Theory 
 
Uncertainty creates a risk premium in the price if the investors are risk averse on average. 
The risk premium is essentially the profit that the risk averse investors expect from taking the 
risk. Risk can be decomposed into systematic and non-systematic risk. Non-systematic risk 
means that price fluctuations are due to reasons that affect only individual stocks (asset 
classes) and a well diversified portfolio neutralises this effect and the risk. Systematic risk is 
related to the price changes on all financial markets. Diversification does not help because the 
asset returns are linearly dependent. The reason for the investors to hedge their asset value is 
that they want to offset the price risk. Futures contract is similar to an insurance because it 
transfers the price risk to someone else for a risk premium. 
 
Carry arbitrage is a situation where the investor profits from the spot price increase. Expected 
price increase is necessary for the investors to hold assets. Also the buyer of the futures 
contract expects the spot price to increase so that he can profit from the possible spot price 
increase when the futures contract matures. In the 1930s, economists John Maynard Keynes 
and John Hicks suggested that the risk premium is a compensation for the investor because 
the risk is transferred from the spot market to the futures market.
11
 When the futures contract 
is made, there is uncertainty over what the future spot price sT would be, but the investors 
estimate through the expected future spot price Et[sT]. The seller of the futures contract 
transfers the risk to the buyer. Since the buyer assumes the risk, he will also want a risk 
premium which should be revealed in the future spot price ST. On the other hand, the buyer 
of the futures contract must see that the investment gives positive yield in the future, or 
otherwise he would not buy the contract. Then the futures price should be less than the 
investor's expectation of the future spot price (equation 13). 
(16) 
 
If the strict inequality holds, the investors expect to receive a risk premium. Equation (14) 
presents the investor's expectations as the sum of the futures price plus the non-negative risk 
premium 
 
                                                 
11
 Referred to by Chance and Brooks, 2004 
fT-x,T < Et[sT] 
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(17) 
  ⇔ 
(18) 
 
The difference Pt corresponds to the risk premium that the buyer of the futures contract 
expects from the market. At this moment, the premium is not specified as strictly constant or 
strictly variable but the time index allows us to keep both options open. Normally, the spot 
price tends to increase and it is rational to expect it to do so (recall the effect of consumption 
commodities). When the market on average expects the spot price to increase, the market is 
said to be in normal backwardation. The seller of the futures contract expects the reverse. He 
will not enter into a futures contract unless he expects that the spot price decreases (equation 
16). Pt is then negative in equation (15), which can be presented as equation (17). When the 
market's opinion on average is that the spot price will decrease, the market is in normal 
contango.  
 
(19) 
  → 
(20) 
Notice that it is not necessary for the expectations of the buyer and the seller to equal in order 
to the futures contract to be traded. Only the inequalities (15) and (17) need to hold separately 
for the buyer and the seller. 
 
Expectations are individual and hidden. Therefore they are not observable.  Econometric 
modelling of the risk premium is done by using the observed spot price sT instead of Et[sT] in 
which case the risk premium equations (18) and (20) will correspond to equation (21). 
Forecasting power is studied the same way: it is the examination of the relationship between 
the observed future spot price and the futures prices before maturity. 
 
(21) 
 
 
 
fT-x,T + Pt = Et[sT] 
Pt = Et [sT] – fT-x,T 
fT-x,T > Et[sT] 
-Pt = Et[sT] – fT-x,T 
Pt = sT – fT-x,T 
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4.5 Econometric Modelling: Univariate Models 
 
The simplest model to test efficiency is presented as the equation (22). It explains the 
logarithmic future spot price sT with a constant α, logarithmic futures price at time T-x and an 
independent error term. As the causality might not appear in the beginning of the life of the 
contract, (when t=0) it is reasonable to examine if the forecasting power changes within time 
i.e. the forecast ability depends on the time lag. 
 
(22) 
 
The errors εT are normally, identically and independently distributed with a zero mean and a 
constant variance. Strict conditions for efficiency (unbiasedness hypothesis) require that the 
difference of the two prices is zero (on average in the long-run). According to the theoretical 
model (22), the difference of the spot price and the futures price can be decomposed in two 
parts, α and β. As the slope of the regression, variable coefficient β indicates how much the 
futures price determines the spot price (forecasting ability). The closer the coefficient β is to 
unity, the better the futures price has predicted the spot price and the market agents are 
rational in making forecasts about the future. What should be determined from the non-zero 
parameter α? Keynes (1930) suggested that α ≠ 0 refers to a constant risk premium. Positive 
constant α is the risk premium the investor receives and negative is the asset holder's risk 
premium (compare with equations (18) and (20)). The constant being zero, the market agents 
can be concluded to be risk neutral. The recent studies suggest that the risk premium is 
variable in time. In that case the risk premium would explain all of the forecast error covering 
both the regression coefficients α and β. When α = 0 and β = 1, the unbiasedness hypothesis 
holds and the model becomes sT = fT-x,T + eT-x (Sabuhoro and Larue, 1997). Even if  α ≠ 0 
and β ≠ 1, futures prices may still pass the prediction hypothesis if the time-series are 
stationary, the model is not autocorrelated and the estimates are statistically significant. Some 
researchers argue that the case when α ≠ 0 and β = 1 implies efficiency but not unbiasedness 
adding another alternative for making conclusions. 
 
Since Engle (1982), ARCH type models have been applied to the risk premium theory in 
order to better explain the spot price behaviour. It is argued that they can reveal risk premium 
sT = α + βfT-x,T + εT  ,    εT ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
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more efficiently. The conditional heteroskedasticity term in the regression is be interpreted as 
time-varying risk premium. The empiria is contradicted. Beck (1993) found that the models 
work well for commodities that are storable giving evidence on time-varying risk premium. 
Forecasting power was found only in the case of soybeans. Frank and Garcia (2009) found 
constant risk premia in agricultural commodities and forecasting power only on the short-
term. 
 
Empirical testing in the commodity markets produces often results that reject the null of 
unbiasedness and prediction. The first difficulty occurs when the time series are found to be 
non-stationary. Usually the difference stationary is tested in order to see if the change is one 
variable follows the other. In efficient markets, the changes in both variables should be equal. 
Unfortunately, that differenced time series may give evidence only on short-term relationship. 
A similar method to differencing is the approach used by Fama and French (1987) who treat 
the basis as an explanatory variable. Modifying equation (9) yields a model where the actual 
spot price change is regressed against the basis. The advantage of this kind of specification is 
that the new time series may be integrated of the same order. In order to test whether equation 
(23) holds, the test model becomes (24). 
 
(23) 
  
 → 
(24) 
 
If β = 1, the model reduces to (22) and the interpretation is the same as before. Equation (23) 
refers to the equations (9) and (12) which assert that the spot price would change only the 
amount of the basis, or the cost of carry. Therefore the spot price change would be due only 
to the theory of storage. Fama and French (1987) made a remark that even though the theory 
of storage and the risk premium are alternative theories, they may not necessarily be 
competing explanations for the basis. When equation (18) is set equal to the basis, the 
presence of risk premium can be found ex-ante (i.e. the anticipated risk premium before 
maturity).
12
 
                                                 
12
 Fama and French (1987) used the notation FT-x,T – ST = PT-x  which will merely yield an opposite sign for 
 sT – sT-x = fT-x,T – sT-x  
  sT – sT-x = α + β(fT-x,T – sT-x) + εT   ,  εT ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
32 
 
 
 
(25) 
 ⇔ 
(26) 
 
 
(27) 
 
The study of Fama and French (1987) gave positive evidence of some forecast power. 
Especially the futures of which the underlying commodity was involved with seasonal 
differences in supply or high storage cost relative to the value of the commodity showed 
strong forecast power. Seasonal changes are expected changes in the supply of the 
commodity and therefore they can be included in the expected futures price. (French, 1986) 
In practise, this refers to agricultural products. Metals did not show this correlation, which is 
consistent with the fact that metals are not affected by seasonals in the supply. The method of 
Fama and French (1987) has also been used by and Serletis and Scowcroft (1991) and Chinn 
and Coibion (2009). Serletis and Scowcroft (1991) studied six agricultural products but none 
of the commodity futures markets was efficient because of time-varying risk premium. 
Predictability was not examined. From a variety of commodities Chinn and Coibion (2009) 
could conclude unbiasedness (and forecasting power) only for energy futures. Other 
commodities did not show even significant forecasting power. Comparing futures prices, 
ARIMA time series of spot prices and random walk, they could see how well these models 
succeeded in predicting the futures spot price. It turned out that the futures prices 
outperformed the random walk as a future price predictor, whereas ARIMA succeeded worst. 
The result is surprising because random walk is difficult to overcome in the financial time 
series but on the other hand, it is evidence of the close relationship of the futures and spot 
markets. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
PT-x. They did not interpret the signs of PT-x, so it is understood here as an alternative representation for the 
traditional one that is presented in the section 4.4. 
PT-x = ET-x[sT] – fT-x,T = fT-x,T – sT-x  
PT-x = sT – fT-x,T  = fT-x,T – sT-x  
 sT – FT-x,T = α + β(fT-x,T – sT-x) + εT   ,   εT ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
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4.6 Econometric modelling: Cointegration Analysis and Error Correction Models 
 
In case the prices are not stationary but integrated of the same order, the relationship can be 
tested using cointegration analysis. When a time series is differenced d times, the non-
differenced series is said to be integrated of degree d. Those time series may be cointegrated 
and a regression with the initial series can be carried out. Cointegration means that there is a 
linear combination zt of the two variables which is I(0). The linear combination is a long-term 
relationship between the variables even though the prices may seem diverging. Commodity 
prices research often uses cointegration analysis. If cointegration cannot be found, efficiency 
will be rejected. When the two series are cointegrated, it is possible to find a cointegrating 
vector (1 - α - β) from the series zT-x 
 
(28) 
 
A cointegrating vector differing from unity (1 0 -1) is analogous with the parameters α ≠ 0 
and β ≠ 1 which refers to a biased estimator (and hence evidence of inefficiency on the 
futures market). It has been suggested that the non-cointegration could be the result of the 
stochastic interest rate (see e.g. Brenner and Kroner, 1995; Yang et al. 2001; Kellard, 2002). 
Brenner and Kroner (1995) argue that the cost of carry is an essential part of the cointegration 
between the futures prices and spot prices because it determines the theoretical futures price 
(no-arbitrage relationship). If the cost of carry has a stochastic trend, the futures and spot 
prices cannot be cointegrated in (28). Stationary cost of carry, on the other hand, will make 
the futures prices and spot prices cointegrated. This may still be only evidence of the no-
arbitrage relationship, not the long-term relationship. Thus, the cointegration analysis should 
be made for the model in equation (29) where the basis is a new additional explanatory 
variable.
13
 
 
(29) 
 
Depending on which variable or variables are important in the no-arbitrage relationship for an 
underlying commodity, the basis can be approximated with either the storage cost or the 
                                                 
13
 Brenner and Kroner (1995) provide detailed explanation why non-cointegrated price time series cannot 
contain information of each other. 
sT – α – βfT-x,T = zT 
   sT = α – β1fT-x,T + β2(fT-x,T – sT-x) + εT   ,   εT ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
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interest rate. The discovery of a cointegrating vector (1, α, -β1, -β2) is again sign of efficiency 
and a cointegrating vector (1, 0, -1, -1) a sign of unbiasedness. Kellard (2002) studied the 
effect of the interest rate as an additional explanatory variable. He found the cointegrating 
vector (1, 0, -1) for the simple regression (25) and a cointegrating vector (1, 0, -1, 1) for a 
regression (31) with the interest rate as an approximation for the basis. The results are in 
contradiction with the theoretical restriction that two linearly dependent variables cannot be 
linearly dependent with a third variable at the same time.
14
 The absence of cointegration 
between the two prices is usually the reason why the efficiency hypothesises are rejected (e.g. 
Mananyi and Struthers (1997)) but even cointegrated models have been rejected. For 
example, in Mohan and Love (2004) some of the cointegrated models showed mild 
autocorrelation. They did, however, reject unbiasedness for the rest of the models but the 
results showed some forecasting power. 
 
The fact that cointegration exists, and that the cointegrating vector is possibly close to unity, 
is not sufficient evidence of a particular price being an effective cause of another price. It is 
equally important to study for the direction of causality. Granger non-causation test can 
reveal the effect of an exogenous variable compared with the own history of the dependent 
variable. Granger Causality means that the exogenous variable has had significant effect on 
the endogenous variable in addition to the lags of the endogenous variable. Another way to 
assess the direction of the causality, the regressions have to be made in both directions, from 
the futures price to spot price and vice versa. The comparison of these two models is the 
ultimate tool in the decision-making: do the variables explain each other or does the causality 
run to only one direction. 
 
The cointegrating equation is obviously an average relationship for a long period of time, so 
in the short-term the variables may have values that do not satisfy the long-run relation and 
hence they are in disequilibrium. Some phenomena have a tendency to move back towards 
the long-run equilibrium. In cointegration analysis this movement can be revealed in an error 
correction model (ECM) which describes the short-term movements, the error correction 
process and short-term dynamics. Following Engle and Granger (1987), ECM consists of the 
short-term dynamics, denoted by ∆yt and ∆xt, and the amount that the variables deviate from 
                                                 
14
 See for example Kellard (2002), Brenner et Kroner (1995) 
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the equilibrium, denoted by the error correction term µt-1 in equation 30. The coefficient of 
the EC term, δ, expresses the intensity of the adjustment process and should have a negative 
sign. The negative sign affects as a reversing factor so that the variables would turn back to 
the equilibrium whether the disequilibrium was above or below it. The EC term coefficient is 
also used to interpret the adjustment time 1/δ, the time that the error correction process takes 
until the variables are in equilibrium again. 
 
 (30) 
 
where 
 (31) 
 
Beck (1994) used the ECM on six agricultural commodities and copper and found that the 
futures are efficient for some time during their maturity. Yang et al. (2001) studied the 
difference in forecast power between storable and non-storable commodities. Results show 
that the futures prices of storable commodities predict future spot prices only slightly better 
than non-storable commodities. They also concluded that futures lead the commodity spot 
prices, and futures prices serve as long-term estimates but warned that production decisions 
should not be based on them. 
 
In order to find out what kind of is the price discovery process, vector autoregressive and 
vector error correction model are used. They are system based approaches to study this 
phenomenon. VAR model explains the endogenous variables with the lags of both variables. 
A general VAR model of cointegrated variables {xt, yt} in (32) has a vector error correction 
representation (33).
15
 VECM is a restricted vector autoregressive model where the differences 
of both exogenous variables are explained by the lags of each other's differences and the 
cointegrating equation. The restriction is that the long-run relationship is cointegrated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 The presentation follows that of Watson (1994): Vector Autoregressions and Cointegration in Handbook of 
Econometrics Vol. 4. 
∆yt = γ∆xt + δµt-1 + εt   ,  εT ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
 
µt = ȳ – (α + βx  ) 
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(32) 
 
 
 
 
(33) 
 
 
 
where 
 
 
In equation pairs (32) and (33) p has the values from 1 to n, n being the number of lags in the 
system and t is the current period. The amount the variables deviate from the equilibrium is 
represented by the cointegrating equation zt, and it affects in the model with a one period 
delay. The short-term dynamics of the system are represented by the parameters θjp and they 
show the effect of the information coming outside the system. The parameters δ11 and δ21 are 
the factors of adjustment speed. Both VAR and VECM can be used to present (possible) the 
price discovery in the market but VECM has been more popular in the commodity research. 
The results of VECM studies have been encouraging. For example, Figuerola-Ferretti and 
Gonzales (2010) found efficiency for three metal futures markets and predictive power for 
one. 
 
4.7 Results from the Research of Coffee Futures Market and Remarks about the 
Futures Market Theory 
 
There is a clear difference between the results of previous coffee futures market studies. The 
old studies made for the coffee market during ICA regulation found efficiency in the futures 
market but after the market liberation the futures markets have not come close to efficiency. 
The earlier studies have not examined the stationarity of the time series and that is why the 
results are not entirely reliable. One of the earliest studies, Kofi (1979) found coffee market 
Δyt = δ11zt-1 +   
 
   1p Δyt-p +   
 
   2p Δxt-p + εt 
Δxt = δ11zt-1 +   
 
   3p Δyt-p +   
 
   4pΔxt-p + εt 
 
εT ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
yt =   
 
   1pyt-p +   
 
   2pxt-p + µt 
xt =   
 
   3pyt-p +   
 
   4pxt-p + µt 
 
µt ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
zt = yt – α – βxt 
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efficient by comparing the explanatory power of different commodity futures. Only the R-
squared was analysed which does not give very much information but it does refer to linear 
correlation between the futures and spot prices. 
 
In Kebede (1993), the coffee futures were found to be unbiased estimates of the future spot 
price when the futures price is made 1-33 weeks before maturity. The Granger Causality tests 
confirm the causality. Futures prices do not explain the spot price at all at 52-77 weeks before 
maturity but the risk premium does. The risk premium is positive when the duration is long, 
indicating that investors are risk averse, and negative when the duration is very small, 
indicating that the investors are risk takers. The behaviour is logical in the sense that when 
the forecasts are made with a long horizon, there is also time for the information to 
accumulate and therefore probability that the new information the affects the spot price is 
high. Thus the positive risk premium is logical for long-distance forecasts. Closer to maturity 
there is more information available and the investors have more confidence in their instincts 
and forecasts. In addition, Kebede (1993) only studied unbiasedness and the unity of the 
futures price coefficient and did not consider the prediction hypothesis. 
 
However, his results should be interpreted with reservation. First of all, stationarity and 
cointegration was not examined so there explanatory power in the estimated regressions may 
be caused by stochastic trend. Secondly, the number of observations is small (25-60) which 
may cause biased estimates (using Ordinary Least Squares). Thirdly, the research period is in 
the middle of the ICA period (1977-1987) which may lead to spurious regression. As the 
objective of the regulation is to keep the spot price in a quite narrow price range, the market 
can expect the future spot prices to be within that range. So, the futures prices would also be 
in that range and the correlation between the variables may be caused by the regulation. For 
example, Kofi (1979) noticed that the R-squared was higher in models that were estimated 
for an ICA period than for a pre-ICA period.  
 
Sabuhoro and Larue (1997) compared three different estimation methods for cointegrated 
series: Engle-Granger two-step estimators, Johansen-Juselius estimators and Hansen‘s Fully 
Modified Ordinary Least Squares. The different methods gave contradicted results but 
Johansen and Juselius‘ method found cointegration for pairs (sT, fT-2,T) and (sT, fT-6,T). The 
unbiasedness hypothesis holds for futures prices with 6 months to maturity and prediction at 
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2 months before maturity. Their sample size is approximately 550 observations from the 
period 1979-1990, thus including a part of the ICA period as well. Their choice of estimation 
method was justified by its appropriateness to well-specified models that are not highly 
autocorrelated but the properties of the prices during the ICA period may not exist in today‘s 
prices. Mohan and Love (2004) represents more recent research. The sample size is about the 
same as in Kebede (1993) but cointegration was found between the prices. The two-way 
regressions could not be interpreted because of autocorrelation. The difference models 
revealed that the causality runs to both directions. 
 
All of these methods are retrospective: they study what happened in the past, how much was 
the risk premium received and how much did the spot price change actually. The theoretical 
futures price is only a basis for the spot price forecasts and the effect of the expectations 
determines the final form of the futures price. Nevertheless, this does not mean that under 
certainty the future spot price would follow the theoretical futures price. A futures price is 
only the future spot price for the particular stock underlying the contract. There will be new, 
fresh commodities on the market that does not necessarily have to carry the interest or storage 
costs. We have no other choice than to believe that the futures price reflects the market 
expectations about the future spot price. In addition, the literature present the futures market 
efficiency with very different hypothesises. Some claim that efficiency can be stated when α 
= 0 and β = 1, but for example Beck (1994) says that it is necessary that only β = 1 and the 
risk premium does not make the futures market inefficient. Nevertheless, even if β = 1 but α ≠ 
0, the difference Ft,T - ST will be non-zero and the unbiasedness hypothesis would be 
rejected. The research field has not yet reached consensus about these definitions. 
 
In this thesis, cointegration analysis, error correction models and vector autoregressive 
models are used to test the efficiency of the coffee market. The vector form models also 
estimate the price discovery between the futures price and the future spot price. The 
advantage of a simple model is that it is easy to interpret. Ordinary Least Squares estimation 
method gives reliable results as long as the residual distribution is close to normality. 
Efficiency is defined as zero difference of the futures price Ft,T  and the future spot price ST, 
so that α = 0 and β = 1. This is uniform with the unbiasedness hypothesis. Prediction 
hypothesis consists of parameters α, β which are elements of real numbers. 
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5 DATA DESCRIPTION AND TIME SERIES PROPERTIES 
 
The futures price and spot price data are provided by the ICE (IntercontinentalExchange) and 
the ICO (International Coffee Organisation) respectively. ICE is the major commodity 
exchange in the North America and its origins are in the late 1900
th
 century when New York 
Board of Trade was founded. The data is from the period of January 1994 to September 2010. 
Arabica was chosen as the reference quality for which the prices are quoted in the New York 
coffee market. Both prices are quoted as dollar cents per pound for green beans (not roasted). 
The spot price data includes 84 monthly observations. The futures prices were originally 
daily observations in five series which were organised futures contracts in terms of nearest 
maturity. The series were reorganised according to the duration with an accuracy of one 
month, so that for example the two month duration series consists of futures prices 
determined two months before expiration, after which monthly means were calculated. The 
mean values were matched to their expiration month creating a time series of monthly 
observations. The reason to reorganise the series is that the duration becomes unified within 
one series. The new series can be seen as observations of the market forecasts in a fixed 
period of time. It is worth remarking that there is not ‗one futures price‘ but many futures 
prices depending of the duration. In fact, it is possible to observe hundreds of futures prices if 
the duration is measured in days. In this study, however, monthly data is used. Using monthly 
data has the advantage that outliers caused by short term overreactions to price signals do not 
disturb the cointegration analysis by separating the spot and futures prices (Ghoshray, 2010). 
On the other hand, aggregation looses information. This case is especially difficult because 
the observations are irregular during a year. All twelve months of the year cannot be used 
since there are only five coffee futures maturing during the year, and thus the number of 
observations is limited. The months when futures contracts mature are March, May, July, 
September and December. The period between two observations is two or three months 
depending on the time of the year. Hence there is one observation for every 2.4 months (=12 
months/5 observations). The final series that were used in the econometric modelling have 
durations 1, 2, 4 and 8 months which include 81 to 84 observations. There are two examples 
of how the futures prices are compared with the futures price in table 1. For example, the 1-
month futures price for a contract that expires in December 2000 is observed in November so 
that it becomes the forecast of the December spot price. The 2-month futures price is 
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observed two months before the contract matures and so forth. All statistical procedures and 
estimation were made by using Eviews version 7. The statistical significance is determined at 
the 5 percent level. The regressions are estimated by using Ordinary Least Squares technique. 
 
Table 1. Example of the comparison of individual futures price and spot price. 
    Futures price observation month for different durations 
Spot price ob-
servation month 
Futures contract 
maturity 1 month 2 months 4 months 8 months 
            
December 2000 December 2000 November 2000 October 2000 August 2000 April 2000 
            
July 2001 July 2001 June 2001 May 2001 March 2001 
November 
2001 
 
Figure 2 is a graph of all the prices. It shows that the coffee prices have fluctuated vastly 
during the sample period. The graphs of all the prices are almost on top of each other which 
indicates that the futures prices and spot prices move together. There are two peaks in the 
beginning of the time series referring to the decreased production due to the frost and drought 
in Brazil in 1994-95 and the speculative trading in 1997. From 1997 to 2002 there was a 
downward sloping trend until 2002. Since then the prices have increased strongly. For 
example, the spot price rose altogether 244 percent from March 2002 to September 2010 and 
18 percent per year on average. 
 
During the whole period the spot price has varied within the range of [48.48, 221.70] (Table 
2). The mean price is 111.22 dollar cents per pound with a standard deviation of 38.90. The 
futures prices move together with the spot price so expectedly their range is nearly the same. 
The two-month duration series (D2) is the most variable in the group. The standard deviation 
of D2 is (39.58) and the series includes the highest and lowest prices of the data. The high 
variability might be the reason why Jarque-Bera statistic fails to identify the normal 
distribution for the D2 series. J-B statistic is small (less than 5) for the spot price and the 
futures prices, except for D2 it is 8.043296. 
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Figure 1. Monthly coffee spot price and futures prices with maturities 1, 2, 4 and 8 months 
from a period of January 1994 to September 2010 
 
For a small sample size, such as 84 observations, the J-B statistic easily states non-normality. 
In this case the histogram seems to be close to the normal distribution. A logarithmic 
transformation was made to the series. The primary reason for the transformation comes from 
the futures market theory. The theoretical futures price (equation 2) is defined as an 
exponential function of the cost-of-carry and convenience yield, and taking the natural 
logarithm transforms the equation to a linear form. As a result, the J-B statistics falls under 5 
for 2-month duration series (Appendix II, table 1). Hereafter, the log-prices are referred to as 
'prices' and f1, f2, f4 and f8 correspond to fT-1,T, fT-2,T, fT-4,T and fT-8,T. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of coffee monthly spot price and futures prices 
 SPOT D1 D2 D4 D8 
 Mean  113.22  111.14  111.38  111.69  111.38 
 Median  111.22  113.84  112.01  113.81  112.48 
 Maximum  221.70  213.10  245.44  217.48  222.03 
 Minimum  48.48  45.14  44.75  48.95  52.10 
 Std. Dev.  38.90  39.09  39.52  36.13  34.38 
 Skewness  0.548557  0.301921  0.649199  0.301493  0.523768 
 Kurtosis  3.262388  2.701122  3.782461  2.971551  3.601448 
      
 Jarque-Bera  4.453773  1.588836  8.043296  1.260225  4.924373 
 Probability  0.107864  0.451844  0.017923  0.532532  0.085248 
 
The data generation process defines what kind of method is used further in the univariate 
regression estimation. The price graph does not show any significant linear trend or seasonal 
variability, though it is a little U-shaped indicating that a nonlinear trend could be present. 
Nevertheless, the price series are usually highly stochastic, random walk processes, and this 
might be the case for the coffee prices as well. A random walk process as a graph looks 
strange, as if there was no clear pattern. It is actually the mathematical presentation of EMH. 
The next value of the variable is very difficult to predict based on the past observations. 
Secondly, the price does not vary around any particular constant. It means that the process 
does not have an attractor that regularly draws the price towards a mean. In fact, the variable 
seems to move away from the starting point. When this is the case, the process is non-
stationary but the first differences are stationary, i.e. it is integrated of order 1 (xt ~I(1)). 
Thirdly, an autoregressive model xt = c + b1xt-1 + et can be fitted to the series. If b1 = 1, the 
series is a random walk. Significant constant coefficient c means that there is a drift involved. 
Based on visual on observation the historical coffee prices do seem stochastic. The results of 
the random walk test model estimations xt = c + b1xt-1 + et are in the appendix II, tables 2-4. 
The Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic, the measure of autocorrelation, is close to 1.5 for all the 
test models and is close to rejecting the no autocorrelation hypothesis. Model RW3 is at least 
autocorrelated. It may actually be an AR(2) in which case the random walk assumption does 
not hold for f2. The constant coefficient is not significant in the models RW1, RW2 and RW4 
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but the first lags are. The coefficients of the lagged variable b1 in these models are close to 
unity as they vary between 0.913907 and 0.942179. In RW5 both the constant and the lagged 
variable are significant, and the coefficient of the lagged variable is high, 0.901294. Unit-root 
and stationarity tests indicate strongly that the prices are I(1) because the s, fT-1,T, fT-2,T, fT-4,T 
and fT-8,T series are non-stationary and the differenced series are stationary (tables 3 and 4). 
There is reason to believe that coffee spot price and futures prices fT-1,T and fT-4,T are random 
walks and the futures price fT-8,T is a random walk with drift. 
 
Table 3. Stationarity tests for series s, fT-1,T, fT-2,T, fT-4,T and fT-8,T. 
  Stationarity test 
  ADF 
  
KPSS   
  
t-test criti-
cal value at 
5% 
t-
statistic 
Prob. 
Asymptotic 
critical val-
ues at 5% 
LM-
statistic 
S -3.464865 -1.741489  0.7238  0.146000  0.261846 
F1 -3.464865 -1.432466  0.8442  0.146000  0.247643 
F2 -3.464865 -1.779648  0.7058  0.146000  0.241455 
F4 -3.465548 -1.897509  0.6468  0.146000  0.234603 
F8 -3.466966 -2.009644  0.5870  0.146000  0.245132 
 
Table 4. Stationarity tests for first differences, series ds, dfT-1,T, dfT-2,T, dfT-4,T and dfT-8,T. 
  Stationarity test 
  ADF 
  
KPSS   
  
t-test criti-
cal value at 
5% 
t-
statistic 
Prob. 
Asymptotic 
critical val-
ues at 5% 
LM-
statistic 
DS -1.944811 -7.935115  0.0000  0.463000  0.104036 
DF1 -1.944811 -7.542869  0.0000  0.463000  0.127514 
DF2  -1.944811 -7.108918  0.0000  0.463000  0.098553 
DF4 -1.944862 -7.373456  0.0000  0.463000  0.089727 
DF8 -1.944969 -7.584514  0.0000  0.463000  0.080203 
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6 EMPRICIAL RESULTS 
 
6.1 Granger Causality in Differences 
 
The analysis now continues to Granger Causality. Due to the random walk property of the 
series the Granger non-causation test had to be conducted for the differenced prices. The test 
is carried out in both directions between two variables for all the prices. The number of lags 
was chosen to be 1 because there is no reason to suspect that a price change would affect 
another price change further in the future. So there is an implicit assumption here that the 
price change affects only the next price change and not the following changes after that. The 
null hypothesis of the test is that there is no Granger Causality between the test variables and 
the alternative hypothesis is that one variable does Granger-cause the other. Small p-values 
indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis. The results are below in table 5. 
 
Table 5. Granger non-causation test for differenced prices 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1 84  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 DF1 does not Granger Cause DS  82  3.91904 0.0512 
 DS does not Granger Cause DF1  39.6132 2.E-08 
    
    
 DF2 does not Granger Cause DS  82  4.21591 0.0434 
 DS does not Granger Cause DF2  303.000 9.E-29 
    
    
 DF4 does not Granger Cause DS  81  5.70795 0.0193 
 DS does not Granger Cause DF4  118.943 2.E-17 
    
    
 DF8 does not Granger Cause DS  79  1.96762 0.1648 
 DS does not Granger Cause DF8  24.8746 4.E-06 
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The change in the spot price has an effect on all futures prices but only the changes of fT-2,T 
and fT-4,T have an effect on the spot price. In addition, the some futures prices affect each 
other. These results suggest that there might be complex relationships between the spot and 
futures prices, though this test does not reveal the real relationship between the level 
variables. In order to analyse the effect of individual prices on each other, pairwise regression 
are estimated. 
 
6.2 Cointegration Analysis and Error Correction Models 
 
Since the variables are integrated of the same order, it is possible to estimate univariate 
regressions between the different prices. The interpretation, however, depends on the 
properties of the residual. The prices are cointegrated if the residual of the test model is 
stationary and has a zero mean. The test models are (34) and (35) and the results are in table 
5.  
 
(34) 
 
(35) 
 
 
All regressions suffer from positive autocorrelation. For the models where futures prices are 
regressors the Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic varies 1.24 and 1.50, and for the models where 
the spot price is the regressor D-W statistic varies between 1.18 and 1.47. The futures seem to 
explain better the spot price than the spot price explains the futures prices. Autocorrelation 
might result from the random walk property of the price series. Coefficients and t-statistics 
cannot be evaluated because of the standard errors are biased, because of the autocorrelation. 
The R-squared is very high for all the models. Models S4 and f81 have the highest R-squared, 
0.93, and even the lowest R-squared is 0.84 (for the models f21 and s2). These models seem to 
explain well the price variance. Yet, R-squared is only a goodness-of-fit measure of the model 
and does not suggest anything about the model specification. But if the R-squared is already 
high, how is it possible to adjust the test models in order to diminish autocorrelation? Since 
the price series are random walks, they are highly autocorrelated. The D-W may improve is a 
fT-x,T = α + βsT + µT-x,T  ,  µT-x,T ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
sT = α + βfT-x,T + µT   ,  µT ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
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lag of the predictor or a non-linear trend is estimated as well. It is also possible to add the lag 
of the dependent variable but it would require another estimation technique. 
 
Table 6. Pairwise regressions with level variables 
                
Residual stationar-
ity     
  Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
t-
Statistic 
Prob.   
R-
squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
stat 
ADF KPSS 
Model: 
S1      
0.919230 1.244817 
No unit-
root 
Stationary 
  C 0.482165 0.137502 3.506598 0.0007 
   
  
  F1 0.901538 0.029511 30.54871 0.0000         
Model: 
S2      
0.849178 1.495124 
No unit-
root 
Stationary 
  C 0.520633 0.193658 2.688415 0.0087 
   
  
  F2 0.892356 0.041530 21.48693 0.0000         
Model: 
S3      
0.863836 1.387321 
No unit-
root 
Stationary 
  C 0.239738 0.195616 1.225556 0.2239 
   
  
  F4 0.949039 0.041866 22.66869 0.0000         
 Model: 
S4      
0.929958 1.246006 
No unit-
root 
Stationary 
  C -0.321689 0.120320 
-
2.673623 
0.0091 
   
  
  F8 1.066631 0.026401 40.40117 0.0000         
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Table 6. (Continued) 
 
Model: 
F1      
0.919230 1.180541 
No unit-
root 
Stationary 
  C -0.116533 0.156283 -0.745659 0.4580 
   
  
  S 1.019624 0.033377 30.54871 0.0000         
Model: 
F2      
0.849178 1.468569 
No unit-
root 
Stationary 
  C 0.205672 0.207372 0.991804 0.3242 
   
  
  S 0.951614 0.044288 21.48693 0.0000         
Model: 
F3      
0.863836 1.349129 
No unit-
root 
Stationary 
  C 0.416278 0.187728 2.217457 0.0294 
   
  
  S 0.910222 0.040153 22.66869 0.0000         
Model: 
F4      
0.929958 1.244432 
No unit-
root 
Stationary 
  C 0.607171 0.125630 4.833004 0.0000 
   
  
  S 0.871865 0.026921 32.38662 0.0000         
 
The cointegration of the univariate models was determined by using the Engle-Granger two-
step method. The first step was taken already in chapter 5: the series need to be integrated of 
the same order. The coffee prices are all integrated of order 1 so the first requirement is 
satisfied. The second step is about testing the residual of the univariate models. The residuals 
of the test models are stationary according to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test 
(ADF) and Kwiatkowsky-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin stationarity test (KPSS), so the spot price is 
cointegrated with the futures prices. The residuals of the cointegrated models are used as a 
variable in an error correction model (equations 37 and 39). The results of the estimation of 
the error correction models dsT = βdfT-x,T + µT-1 + εT and fT-x,T = α + βsT + µT-1 + εT-x are in 
table 4. Each ECM corresponds to one regression model in table 6. Heteroskedasticity was 
found in ecm1, ecm2, ecm3 and ecm8, but the White correction did not affect the statistical 
significance of the coefficients. Coefficients in the table 7 are White corrected. 
 
There is no autocorrelation present, except in error correction model number 6 (ECM6) the D-
W statistics is 1.193891, which is even smaller than the D-W of the cointegrating equation. 
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The same model (ECM6) has the highest R-squared (0.844714) which is strange. On the 
contrary, the ECM6, which regresses the f2 price against the spot price, has the lowest R-
squared (0.29) but a reasonably good D-W statistic (1.857070). It seems that the futures price 
fT-2,T explains a small proportion of the change in the spot price but the spot price explains a 
large part of the fT-2,T. All coefficients in the estimated error correction models are 
statistically significant at 5 percent level and the error correction term is negative, as they 
should be. The interpretation of the models (except ECM6) is as follows: 
 
Error correction model with the spot price as the dependent variable: 
 
The R-squared of ECM1 is 0.67 which means the change in f1 and the error correction term 
explain 67 percent of the total variability of the spot price change. DfT-1,T represents the 
short-term dynamics in the process. When dfT-1,T changes 1 unit, ds changes 1.15 units, 
which is 1.15 percent change in the actual spot price difference. The interpretation is 
troublesome but let us thinks the process as follows: If the change in fT-1,T becomes smaller, 
the change in spot price becomes a little smaller. On the other hand, if the change in fT-1,T 
increases, the change in the spot price increases a little more. The error correction coefficient 
-0.811395 corresponds to an adjustment time factor 1.23. If the adjustment time is calculated 
by using the average observation period (2.4), then it takes 3.0 months for the spot price and 
the futures price to adjust to the equilibrium level. The low R-squared of ECM2, 0.29, 
indicates that the difference of fT-2,T and the error correction term do not explain enough of 
the variability of s. The coefficients are statistically significant, though, and according to 
them a 1 percent change in the difference of the 2-month futures price causes the spot price 
difference to change 1.32 percent. 
 
The adjustment time is 2.0 months. The r-squared of ECM3 is only slightly better than that of 
ECM2, 0.39. A one percent change in the difference of the 4-month futures price causes the 
spot price difference to change 1.31 percent. The adjustment time is 2.3 months. Variable dfT-
8,T and error correction term have been reasonably good explanators for s as they explain 70 
percent of the variability of s. Short-term dynamics say that a 1 percent change in the 8-
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month futures price difference changes the spot price difference to change 1.1 percent. The 
adjustment to the equilibrium level takes 3.7 months. 
 
Error correction models with the spot price as the explanatory variable: 
 
ECM5 fits well to the data as the difference of s and the error correction term explain 75 
percent of the variability of fT-1,T difference. A one percent change in the spot price difference 
causes the 1-month futures price difference to change 0.56 percent and the adjustment time is 
3.6 months. ECM7 has the second best r-squared amongst the error correction models, 0.80. 
The spot price difference causes the 4-month future price difference to change 0.23 percent. 
The adjustment time is 2.8 months. The r-squared of ECM8  is 0.78. The spot price difference 
causes the 8-month futures price to change 0.6 percent. The adjustment time is 3.2 months. 
 
The longest adjustment time is in the adjustment process of 8-month futures price explaining 
the spot price (3.7 months) and the shortest in the adjustment process of 2-month futures 
price explaining the spot price (2.3 months). The average adjustment time amongst the 
models where the spot price is the dependent variable is 2.75 months which is less than the 
average for the models where spot price is the predictor (3.2 months). Based on the error 
correction models the adjustment process of the futures and spot prices is faster when the 
futures price explains the spot price. In addition, the spot price seems to overreact to the 
futures price changes because the coefficients of the dfx terms are above one. The spot price 
has a lesser effect on the futures price. 
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Table 7. Error correction models based on the pairwise regressions 
ECM 
 Dependent 
Variable: F8 
           
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   R-squared 
Durbin-
Watson stat 
  
ECM1         0.666193 1.921997    
DF1 1.145692 0.107026 10.70479 0.0000       
EC(-1) -0.811395 0.088948 -9.122154 0.0000       
ECM2         0.287916 1.857070      
DF2 1.322851 0.278156 4.755787 0.0000       
EC(-1) -1.178734 0.249111 -4.731758 0.0000       
ECM3         0.394586 1.853014      
DF4 1.309159 0.169645 7.717066 0.0000       
EC(-1) -1.026893 0.182752 -5.619042 0.0000       
ECM4         0.696806 1.926483      
DF8 1.095557 0.083331 13.14710 0.0000       
EC(-1) -0.653124 0.126576 -5.159932 0.0000       
ECM5         0.753790 1.871279      
DS 0.556078 0.047914 11.60568 0.0000       
EC(-1) -0.660193 0.069551 -9.492276 0.0000       
ECM6         0.844714 1.193891      
DS 0.137136 0.042793 3.204625 0.0019       
EC(-1) -0.921600 0.046800 -19.69250 0.0000       
ECM7         0.798176 1.703607      
DS 0.230997 0.045190 5.111706 0.0000       
EC(-1) -0.867027 0.055858 -15.52209 0.0000       
ECM8         0.779845 1.767907      
DS 0.601790 0.102134 12.25828 0.0000       
EC(-1) -0.747862 0.148174 -5.047182 0.0000       
 
6.3 Vector Autoregressive and Vector Error Correction Models 
 
As the ECM is an adjustment process to the current equilibrium value, the individual ECMs 
imply that the different coffee prices are involved in the adjustment process of each other. In 
order to present the price discovery in the coffee market, a VAR model is estimated. The lag 
structure of the models was chosen based on the autocorrelation LM-tests. According to the 
LM-test there is no autocorrelation in the models when the lag structure is 1. The s and f1 are 
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exceptions because the autocorrelation disappears only until a VAR with three lags was 
estimated. The test model is equation (36). The estimation results are in table 3 and the 
diagnostics in table 4, both in appendix II. The estimation results for VAR1 with three lags 
(VAR5) are in table 5. 
 
(36) 
 
 
 
In VAR1 the LM-statistic is high on the third lag. It is not statistically significant at 1 percent 
level but it may have to be taken seriously. The VAR estimation with three lags shows no 
autocorrelation within 10 lags and is more reliable than with one lag. All the VAR models 
show high R-squared values, the lowest being 0.82 and the highest being 0.98. The residuals 
are normal only in VAR5 and homoskedastic in VAR2 and VAR3, which can be interpreted. 
The t-value at 5 percent is 1.990. In VAR2, the spot price and the futures price are dependent 
on the spot price of the previous period. The 2-month futures price is entirely dependent on 
the first lag of the spot price. It means that the futures price at time T-2 is dependent on the 
spot price at time T-1. Thus VAR2 implies causality from the spot price to the futures price 
but not vice versa. The spot price also consists of a constant. In VAR3 the spot price is 
dependent on the futures price fT-4,T and the spot price. The coefficient (-0.27) indicates that 
the future spot has a decreasing effect on the future spot price.  
 
Table 8. Significant VAR models 
VAR2 R-squared 
sT  = 0.45 + 1.13*sT-1 0.82 
fT-2.T = 0.99*sT-1 0.98 
VAR3  
sT  = 0.55 + 1.15*sT-1 + (-0.27)*fT-4-1,T 0.82 
fT-4,T = 0.90*sT-1 0.96 
 
In order to examine more the direction of causality, Granger Causality is tested in VAR form. 
This is possible because the initial price series are cointegrated and showed little causality in 
sT = π11sT-1 + π21fT-x-1,T + µT 
fT-x,T = π31sT-1 + π41fT-x-1,T + µT-x 
 
µt ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
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both directions. The Granger Causation in VAR form is based on (36). If there is Granger 
Causation from the exogenous test variable to the endogenous test variable, the π21 or π41 
remain significant. The results of the Var Granger/Block Exogeneity Wald test are in table 9. 
The null hypothesis is that the exogenous test variable does not Granger-cause the 
endogenous variable (for example, in sT, the parameters the π21 = 0 (equation 36)). The 
probability that s does not Granger-cause any of the logarithmic futures prices is very small 
(Prob. 0.0000) and to the other direction the probability is above the 5 percent level 
indicating that π31 is significant. Hence the spot price Granger-cause the futures prices. 
Futures prices f4 and f8 also Granger-cause the spot price as the π21 is significant. The spot 
price Granger-causes the futures prices but the futures prices do not Granger-cause the spot 
price. The results are similar to the Granger non-causation test in differences (table 5) except 
that it implies Granger Causality from the 2-month and 4-month (fT-2,T and fT-4,T) futures 
prices to the spot price. 
 
Table 9. a) – d) VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests for the series s, f1, f2, 
f4 and f8 
Dependent variable: S   
 
Dependent variable: S   
         Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
F1  0.840168 1  0.3593 
 
F2  3.638736 1  0.0564 
All  0.840168 1  0.3593 
 
All  3.638736 1  0.0564 
         Dependent variable: F1   
 
Dependent variable: F2   
         Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
S  40.04210 1  0.0000 
 
S  489.4603 1  0.0000 
All  40.04210 1  0.0000 
 
All  489.4603 1  0.0000 
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Table 9. (Continued) 
 
Dependent variable: S   
 
Dependent variable: S   
         Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
F4  4.119885 1  0.0424 
 
F8  4.646619 1  0.0311 
All  4.119885 1  0.0424 
 
All  4.646619 1  0.0311 
         Dependent variable: F4   
 
Dependent variable: F8   
         Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
S  229.2111 1  0.0000 
 
S  37.93812 1  0.0000 
All  229.2111 1  0.0000 
 
All  37.93812 1  0.0000 
 
Equation system (37) is the VECM form of the VAR in (36). The differences of the 
exogenous variables are explained by the cointegrating equation zT, which is the long run 
relationship, and the first two lags of both exogenous variables. 
 
(37) 
 
 
where 
 
 
Tables 5 a) - d) in appendix II present the estimation results of VECM estimations and the 
significant VECM models are below in table 10. At least one of the coefficients δ11 and δ21 
should be non-zero so that the results of the Var Granger/Block Exogeneity Wald test would 
be confirmed. At the 5 percent level the critical t-test value is 1.990. Tests for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity are in table 6, appendix II. Autocorrelation was not found but VECM1 
has mild heteroskedasticity in the residual.  
 
The spot price change has significant coefficients only in VECM1 as the first lag is 
significant. The spot price change in the previous period causes the spot price to change 0.43 
percent. The model seems to be poor because the R-squared is low (0.12). The futures price 
difference has significant coefficients in the same model as well. A one percent change in the 
ΔsT = δ11zT-1 +  11ΔsT-1 +  12ΔsT-2 +  21ΔfT-1-x +  22ΔfT-2-x + εT 
 
ΔfT-x = δ21zT-1 +  31ΔsT-1 +  32ΔsT-2 +  41ΔfT-1-x +  42ΔfT-2-x + εT-x 
 
εT ~ NID(0, δ
2
) 
 zT = sT – αL – βLfT-x,T 
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first lags of both spot and futures price affect the upcoming futures price change by 0.59 and -
0.50 percent, respectively. The two difference terms explain about 36 percent of the total 
variability of the change in the futures price. The disequilibrium does not cause the spot price 
to change as the coefficients δ11 are zero. The futures price, on the other hand, is often 
affected by the disequilibrium. The coefficient δ31 is significant in VECM2 VECM3 and 
VECM4. In these models the futures price is determined further away from the spot price (i.e. 
the duration is longer) than in VECM1, which does not give a significant coefficient for zT. 
Hence, VECM1 is not a vector error correction model in its true sense. 
 
Table 10. Significant VEC models with the cointegrating equation if significant. 
 
VEC model Cointegrating equation 
    
VECM1   
dsT = 0.43*dsT-1    
dfT-1 = 0.59*dsT-1  – 0.50*dfT-2,T (No cointegrating equation) 
VECM2   
dfT-2,T = 0.63*zT-1 + 0.35*dsT-1   
  zT = sT – 0.29 – 0.94*fT-2,T 
VECM3    
dfT-4,T = 0.83*zT-1   
  zT = sT – 0.99fT-4,T 
VECM4    
dfT-8,T = 0.51*zT-1   
  zT = sT + 0.65 – 1.14fT-8,T 
 
 
In VECM2 the 2-month futures price changes 0.63 percent when the disequilibrium extent is 
1 percent and 0.35 when the spot price difference changes one percent. The cointegrating 
equation suggests that there is a long-term relationship sT = 0.29 + 0.94*fT-2. As the 2-month 
futures price changes one percent, the spot price changes 0.94 percent to the same direction. 
There is a positive constant indicating a constant risk premium for (futures) the investor. In 
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VECM3 the change in the 4-month futures price changes 0.83 percent when the extent of 
disequilibrium is 1 percent. The cointegrating equation is sT = 0.99fT-4. The long-term 
coefficient bL is close to 1 which is a sign of unbiasedness. VECM2 and VECM3 have quite 
high R-squared (0.86 and 0.74) for error correction models. Especially in dfT-4 this means that 
the movements in the futures price are mostly about error correction. In VECM4 the 
coefficient of zT is 0.51, which means that the futures price change absorbs approximately 
half of the disequilibrium as an error correction adjustment. The model has an R-squared of 
0.31. The coefficients of the cointegrating equation are d11 = 0 and d21 > 0 often, so the 
adjustment falls on the futures price in the system. The spot price does not react to the 
disequilibrium so it is the information leader of the price discovery. 
 
The test results of Granger non-causation tests and regression estimations with the futures 
price as an explanatory variable of spot price are in table 11. The 4-month futures price has 
affected the spot price in most tests. Only the VEC model did not include the futures price 
difference in the spot price difference equation. The next best performed futures prices were 
fT-2,T and fT-8,T which showed causality in two tests. As all univariate regression models were 
cointegrated (both futures and spot price as explanatory variables), it is not clear if the prices 
really affect each other or if the process is only co-movement. 
 
Table 11. Summary of the test results: implication of causality 
Test / Model fT-1,T → s fT-2,T → s fT-4,T → s fT-8,T → s 
Granger Causality in Differences No Yes Yes No 
Individual Error Correction Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Vector Autoregressive No No Yes No 
VAR Granger Causality No No Yes Yes 
Vector Error Correction No No No No 
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7 DISCUSSION 
 
One could say that since the coffee prices are random walks the coffee market is efficient as 
such. Information is absorbed perfectly in the prices and nobody can profit from arbitrage as 
the prices are highly unpredictable. In some sense a social or scientific objective is fulfilled. 
Inefficiency may lead to the widening of income differences if few investors receive 
abnormally excess profits. At the grass root level there is the coffee producer who often has 
limited ability to receive real-time information about the market, not to mention predict the 
future development of the coffee price. 
 
Yet, unpredictability is not a sufficient reason to state efficiency when the futures markets are 
involved. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis holds in the futures market when the futures 
forecast the future spot prices right on average and nobody can profit from arbitrage between 
the two prices. However, the traditional approach to testing futures market efficiency is a 
univariate regression model where highly autoregressive coffee prices are difficult to fit in to. 
The estimated models indicate mild autocorrelation which means that the spot price has 
another cause that has not been specified. The problem is difficult to solve. Another 
estimation technique may help but it is more important to consider the reason underlying the 
autocorrelation. The random walk property of the spot price means that it is highly dependent 
on its own history which may be the root cause of the autocorrelation. Perhaps an AR or 
ARIMA could forecast the coffee spot price better than an exogenous futures price but the 
research question is still open: can the futures price predict the future spot prices? 
 
Testing for the direction of the causality, the results were quite similar. The Granger Causality 
in differences tests detected that futures price influences the spot price in the case of 2- and 4-
month forecast horizons and the VAR Granger Causality in the case of 4- and 8-month 
forecast horizons. Both tests indicate strong causality from the spot prices to the futures price 
at all durations. Therefore it is possible that there is causality to both directions supporting the 
hypothesis of common price discovery. The VAR estimation supports the causality result only 
in the case of 4-month futures while the VAR model with the 8-month futures price does not 
affect the spot price and the rest of regression models failed in the residual diagnostic tests. 
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The error correction models are rather inconclusive. The individual error correction models 
fare well in terms of the error correction term to both directions. According to them there is 
clearly a tendency for both the prices to adjust to the equilibrium level but the VEC models 
cannot recognise this. Only VECM1 consists of both difference equations but do not include 
the cointegrating equation. Since the residuals are heteroskedastic, the coefficients may not 
actually be significant. If they were significant, the results imply that the prices act as a 
system when the futures contract is close to maturity but not when the time until maturity is 
greater than 1 month. The system is missing the cointegrating equation so that the two prices 
do not have an equilibrium to adjust to. The adjustment process is perhaps not needed. After 
all, the variables are cointegrated meaning that they move together. After the change, the both 
prices may have reached values that satisfy the cointegrating equation making the error term 
zero. Causality cannot be stated for this model because of the non-significance of the 
cointegrating equation. 
 
In the VECMs where the futures price has the duration of 2 months or more, the error 
correction process affects through the futures price and respectively, the futures price 
difference depends solely on the error of the cointegrating equation. Since it is the futures 
price that reacts to the disequilibrium, the model implies that the spot price is the leader of the 
price discovery at 2 months and more before the futures contract expires. VECM3 is 
particularly interesting. Approximately 70 percent of the change in the 4-month futures price 
is error correction. In addition, the cointegrating vector is very close to unity, (1 0 -0.99). The 
futures price at time t predicts the future spot price at time t+4 quite accurately on average. 
Since the spot price does not react to the disequilibrium at all and the futures prices do, the 
model implies that the spot price is the primary price that absorbs the information in the 
coffee market and thus is the leader in the coffee market price discovery. So the VECM 
finding differs from that of the VAR as it fails to identify the causality from the 4-month 
futures price to the spot price. 
 
The causality from the spot price to the futures prices is illogical from the empiristic view of 
causality. An observation in the future cannot predict or explain another observation in the 
past. On the contrary, the current spot price and the futures price do have a relation, the 
theoretical futures price, but those prices are observed at the same time. What about the 
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autoregressive time series structure of the spot price? Correlation between sT and fT-1,T is 
possible since they are both dependent on sT-1 but as they both receive information from sT-1, 
sT cannot cause fT-1,T. What seems to be the case here is that there is only spurious regression 
between the coffee futures and spot prices, and the prices move together because they are 
based on the same information: weather conditions and the expected crop size, amount of 
inventories and so on. This may be the reason why the VEC models found cointegrating 
equations but not causality from the futures to the spot market. For the causality running from 
the spot price to the futures prices, there is no logical economic explanation. 
 
If cointegration was a relation between the prices only in a mathematical sense, the risk 
premium could be interpreted. In VAR modelling, only VAR3 has a constant coefficient in the 
spot price equation (0.55). The interpretation is difficult because the equation has also the 
first lag of the dependent variable as one explanatory variable. The constant coefficient is 
positive, though, indicating that the spot price would rise whatever the effects of the other 
explanatory variables. The VECM has more significant models that include the constant 
coefficient. Investors are (supposedly and afterwards) rewarded with a risk premium when 
the duration of the futures contract is 2 months and the asset sellers are rewarded when the 
duration is 8 months. These are only single moments of time for which the risk premium 
receiver is possible to determine. The investor‘s risk premium is likely to be present around 
the two-month futures price, possibly up to the 4-month futures price, and the asset seller‘s 
risk premium around the 8-month risk premium. The coffee market is risk averse when the 
futures are close to maturity and risk taker when the time until maturity is long. 
 
Can the futures price be trusted as a forecast? The test results showed that there is little 
causality from the futures prices to the spot price that would support the forecasting ability. 
Some cointegrating vectors were still found: one vector close to unity supporting the 
unbiasedness hypothesis, two vectors supporting only prediction hypothesis. In general, the 
4-month futures price seems to be the best predictor for the spot price amongst the duration 
series tested in this thesis. Only the vector error correction models did not recognise the effect 
of the futures price on the spot price. This result is quite strong as it reveals the primary 
information absorber in the price discovery. Is the regression only spurious? Perhaps, but if it 
really is a long-run relation, it is likely to persist in the future. A forecast or not, the 
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historically the outcome has been the same, though the futures price is not a certain forecast. 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the final price is determined by the aggregate output. 
Even though the producer would guess right the spot price range, the final spot price is 
determined also on the basis of the actual output. An individual producer does not know 
which output determines which price, and moreover, which price should he anticipate so that 
given a certain production amount, the market price at harvest would be the same. Therefore 
the producer could not entirely trust the futures price as an indicative forecast. (Mohan & 
Love, 2004) Secondly, the theoretical foundation for the efficiency theory is logical but not 
very solid. During the time between two prices, the amount of information has increased. ST 
is based on more information than fT-x,T. The market simply knows more today than 
yesterday. In fact it would be more rational to claim that these prices should be different 
rather than equal. Forecasting is much appreciated, only it does not seem realistic to seek for 
in the futures market. 
 
As a conclusion, it is difficult to determine efficiency in the futures market or if predictive 
power exists from the futures prices to the spot price based on these tests. The spot price 
seems to cause strongly the futures price which does not have a rational economic 
explanation. Even if this relation is rejected as spurious regression, can we still trust the other 
relationship where the futures price explains the spot price? There is causality from the 2- and 
4-month futures price to the spot price in differences and the ECM confirms this but they 
only explain price changes. The relationship of the coffee prices can be seen fully only in 
levels. Granger Causality was found from the 4- and 8-month futures prices to the spot price 
but VAR model could only capture the effect of the 4-month futures price in the spot price 
equation. However, VAR models cannot be applied to examine efficiency as there they 
include lags of the dependent variable as predictors but they are useful as indicators of 
causality and price discovery. This price discovery did not show in the corresponding VEC 
models. The cointegrating equations are significant in most models but the spot price 
difference equation does not include the futures price difference as an explanatory variable. 
Therefore it is difficult to claim that the cointegrating equation where the futures price is a 
predictor is the actual real world relation. Based on the VAR models, the Var Granger 
Causality test and the cointegrating equation in the VEC models, the 4-month futures price is 
a possible unbiased predictor of the future spot price. 
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These results are quite the same as in other coffee futures research. Autocorrelation hinders 
the interpretation of the traditional model which would be the simplest and efficient way to 
analyse futures market efficiency. Autocorrelation is likely to be a result of the production 
that lags behind the price movement. If this problem was overcome somehow, the univariate 
models could be interpreted. VEC modelling has not yet been applied to the coffee futures, so 
there are few references to compare these results with. In the end, it all comes down to 
random walk. This process generates values that are literally unpredictable, so why should 
the futures be able to predict them? If the futures could predict the futures spot price changes, 
that information would be known to the market and investors would be able to gain excess 
profit from either the futures market or the spot market. That would be against the general 
idea of efficiency. The coffee market is simply so efficient that even the futures prices cannot 
forecast the future spot prices. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The coffee futures and spot prices were examined for the signs of market efficiency. Based on 
the empirical tests in this thesis, the coffee futures prices cannot surely be concluded to be 
unbiased estimates of the future spot price. The tests showed that the 4-month futures price 
could be an unbiased estimate of the future spot price which implies futures market 
efficiency. The lack of causality support from the VECM causes this result to be uncertain. 
The cointegrating vectors with the 2- and 8-month futures prices were also significant in VEC 
analysis but evidence of causality is weaker than in the case of the 4-month futures price. 
Cointegration may be caused by the fact that both prices are quoted for the same commodity 
and thus share the same information. On the contrary, the tests showed that the future spot 
price would affect the past futures price but this result has no rational explanation. The 
investors are risk averse when making forecast with a short horizon and risk takers when the 
forecasts are made for a long period of time. The random walk property of the prices makes 
the coffee market efficient as it is but the efficiency of the futures market is inconclusive. 
This result may be due to some fundamental problems in the coffee industry such as the price 
elasticity of supply caused by short-term under- and overproduction. The small sample size 
and the aggregation of the data may have affected the estimation as well. A renewal of the 
study with a larger sample size is needed. 
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Appendix I: Table of abbreviations 
 
ADF Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit-root test 
dx Futures Price with a Duration of x Months 
CBOT Chicago Board of Trade 
ECM Error Correction Model 
EMH Efficient Market Hypothesis 
fx Logarithm of the Futures Price with a Duration of x Months; Ln(dx) 
GNP Gross National Product 
ICA International Coffee Agreement 
ICE InterContinental Exchange 
ICO International Coffee Organisation 
KPSS Kwiatkovsky-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OTC Over-the-Counter 
NID Normally, identically and independently distributed 
s Spot Price 
SMI Supplier-managed Inventory System 
VARM Vector Autoregressive model 
VECM Vector Error Correction model 
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Appendix II: Estimation and Test Results 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on logarithmic prices 
 
 S F1 F2 F4 F8 
 Mean  4.67  4.64  4.65  4.66  4.66 
 Median  4.71  4.73  4.72  4.73  4.72 
 Maximum  5.40  5.36  5.50  5.38  5.40 
 Minimum  3.88  3.81  3.80  3.89  3.95 
 Std. Dev.  0.36  0.38  0.37  0.35  0.32 
 Skewness -0.312769 -0.468119 -0.337669 -0.473578 -0.323593 
 Kurtosis  2.561241  2.475298  2.675388  2.560227  2.638511 
      
 Jarque-Bera  2.043331  4.031488  1.965094  3.771327  1.854644 
 Probability  0.359995  0.133221  0.374356  0.151728  0.395612 
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Table 2. Estimation results of fitted AR(1) models for series s, f1, f2, f4 and f8 
  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
  
    
  
Dependent Variable:   S C 0.411402 0.226088 1.819651 0.0725 
Included observations: 83 
after adjustments 
S(-1) 0.913907 0.048358 18.89869 0.0000 
    
  
  R-squared 0.815136 Durbin-Watson stat 1.569449   
RW1 
    
  
Dependent Variable: F1 C 0.278138 0.183611 1.514824 0.1337 
Included observations: 83 
after adjustments 
F1(-1) 0.942179 0.039461 23.87634 0.0000 
    
  
  R-squared 0.875591 Durbin-Watson stat 1.601117   
RW2 
    
  
Dependent Variable: F2 C 0.380844 0.207688 1.833733 0.0704 
Included observations: 83 
after adjustments 
F2(-1) 0.920077 0.044592 20.63313 0.0000 
    
  
  R-squared 0.840150 Durbin-Watson stat 1.484835   
 RW3         
  
 
 
Dependent Variable: F4 
C 0.389028 0.203361 1.912996 0.0593 
Included observations: 82 
after adjustments 
F4(-1) 0.918015 0.043551 21.07906 0.0000 
    
  
  R-squared 0.847423 Durbin-Watson stat 1.552760   
RW4           
Dependent Variable: F8 C 0.467778 0.229271 2.040285 0.0447 
Included observations: 80 
after adjustments 
F8(-1) 0.901294 0.049081 18.36340 0.0000 
    
  
  R-squared 0.812145 Durbin-Watson stat 1.608603   
RW5           
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Table 3. Vector autoregressive model estimation results 
Endogenous variables: s, f1       
 Included observations: 83 after adjustments 
  
 VAR1 S(-1) F1(-1) C R-squared 
Sum sq. 
residuals 
S  1.062175 -0.144883  0.392109 0.817057 1.924552 
   (0.16885)  (0.15806)  (0.22729) 
  
  [ 6.29082] [-0.91661] [ 1.72516] 
  
F1  0.764263  0.256745  -0.105981 0.917090 0.984739 
   (0.12078)  (0.11307)  (0.16258) 
  
  [ 6.32788] [ 2.27076] [-0.65186] 
  
Endogenous variables: s, f2 
   
 Included observations: 83 after adjustments 
  
  VAR2 S(-1) F2(-1) C R-squared 
Sum sq. 
residuals 
S  1.127465 -0.223329  0.452734 0.823179 1.860156 
   (0.12165)  (0.11708)  (0.22355) 
  
  [ 9.26817] [-1.90755] [ 2.02524] 
  
F2  0.988250  0.044770 -0.162249 0.977544 0.250811 
   (0.04467)  (0.04299)  (0.08209) 
  
  [ 22.1237] [ 1.04141] [-1.97659] 
  
Endogenous variables: s, f4 
   
 Included observations: 83 after adjustments 
  
  VAR3 S(-1) F4(-1) C R-squared 
Sum sq. 
residuals 
S  1.153427 -0.268813  0.545924 0.821117 1.824387 
   (0.13056)  (0.13244)  (0.22944) 
  
  [ 8.83466] [-2.02975] [ 2.37933] 
  
F4  0.902648  0.066217  0.152306 0.960892 0.380467 
   (0.05962)  (0.06048)  (0.10478) 
  
  [ 15.1397] [ 1.09487] [ 1.45358] 
  
Endogenous variables: s, f8 
   
 Included observations: 83 after adjustments 
  
  VAR4 S(-1) F8(-1) C R-squared 
Sum sq. 
residuals 
S  1.278935 -0.434859  0.735789 0.822193 1.766837 
   (0.18187)  (0.20173)  (0.25636) 
  
  [ 7.03214] [-2.15560] [ 2.87013] 
  
F8  0.849712 -0.007731  0.752821 0.874151 1.016582 
   (0.13795)  (0.15302)  (0.19446) 
  
  [ 6.15939] [-0.05052] [ 3.87139] 
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Table 4. a) — c) VAR residual diagnostics 
 
a) VAR Residual Normality Tests 
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl) 
        
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal 
       
            
VAR1            
Included observations: 83 
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
Jarque-
Bera 
df Prob. 
                        
1  1.100604  16.75672 1  0.0000  5.366587  19.36920 1  0.0000  36.12592 2  0.0000 
2  0.667712  6.167443 1  0.0130  2.951708  0.008065 1  0.9284  6.175508 2  0.0456 
                        
Joint    22.92416 2  0.0000    19.37727 2  0.0001  42.30143 4  0.0000 
                        
            
VAR2            
Included observations: 83 
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
Jarque-
Bera 
df Prob. 
                        
1  1.011088  14.14181 1  0.0002  5.118630  15.52305 1  0.0001  29.66486 2  0.0000 
2  0.422707  2.471759 1  0.1159  6.173539  34.83009 1  0.0000  37.30184 2  0.0000 
                        
Joint    16.61356 2  0.0002    50.35314 2  0.0000  66.96670 4  0.0000 
                        
            
VAR3            
Included observations: 82 
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
Jarque-
Bera 
df Prob. 
                        
1  0.962208  12.65321 1  0.0004  4.959723  13.12176 1  0.0003  25.77497 2  0.0000 
2  0.165961  0.376423 1  0.5395  4.389856  6.599976 1  0.0102  6.976399 2  0.0306 
                        
Joint    13.02963 2  0.0015    19.72174 2  0.0001  32.75137 4  0.0000 
                        
            
VAR4            
Included observations: 80 
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
Jarque-
Bera 
df Prob. 
                        
1  0.761078  7.723198 1  0.0055  4.770171  10.44501 1  0.0012  18.16821 2  0.0001 
2  0.165039  0.363170 1  0.5468  6.401483  38.56694 1  0.0000  38.93011 2  0.0000 
                        
Joint    8.086368 2  0.0175    49.01196 2  0.0000  57.09832 4  0.0000 
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b) VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Probs from chi-square with 4 df. 
    
       VAR1 
   
VAR2 
  Included observations: 83 
 
Included observations: 83 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  8.220214  0.0838 
 
1  3.831592  0.4293 
2  8.444773  0.0766 
 
2  6.510599  0.1641 
3  13.00968  0.0112 
 
3  8.039158  0.0902 
4  1.749121  0.7818 
 
4  3.262309  0.5149 
5  2.127816  0.7123 
 
5  2.281396  0.6842 
6  3.258690  0.5155 
 
6  1.071612  0.8987 
7  3.959844  0.4115 
 
7  2.661995  0.6159 
8  0.864130  0.9296 
 
8  1.313996  0.8590 
9  1.982866  0.7389 
 
9  0.939874  0.9188 
10  3.975079  0.4094 
 
10  4.289658  0.3682 
       
       VAR3 
   
VAR4 
  Included observations: 82 
 
Included observations: 80 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  3.069257  0.5463 
 
1  3.732319  0.4434 
2  4.832164  0.3050 
 
2  4.005202  0.4053 
3  5.212384  0.2662 
 
3  2.935426  0.5687 
4  2.456393  0.6525 
 
4  2.128902  0.7121 
5  2.225961  0.6943 
 
5  2.029595  0.7303 
6  0.758652  0.9439 
 
6  1.888289  0.7563 
7  2.210014  0.6972 
 
7  2.652408  0.6176 
8  1.010792  0.9082 
 
8  2.885236  0.5772 
9  0.608890  0.9621 
 
9  2.118832  0.7139 
10  2.077010  0.7216 
 
10  1.127648  0.8899 
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c) VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests 
 
Includes Cross Terms 
  
Null hypothesis: No  heteroskedasticity 
      
VAR1 
    
Included observations: 83 
   
Joint test:     
   Chi-sq df Prob. 
   
 25.61065 15  0.0423 
   
      Individual components:       
      
Dependent R-squared F(5,77) Prob. Chi-sq(5) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.101230  1.734520  0.1367  8.402056  0.1354 
res2*res2  0.027386  0.433625  0.8238  2.273068  0.8102 
res2*res1  0.060396  0.989886  0.4296  5.012879  0.4143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      VAR2 
     
Included observations: 83 
   
Joint test:     
   
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   
 21.42949 15  0.1237 
   
      Individual components:       
      Dependent R-squared F(5,77) Prob. Chi-sq(5) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.079749  1.334559  0.2587  6.619142  0.2505 
res2*res2  0.033341  0.531166  0.7520  2.767328  0.7358 
res2*res1  0.019767  0.310551  0.9052  1.640663  0.8963 
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VAR3 
     Included observations: 82 
   Joint test:     
   
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   
 23.37757 15  0.0764 
   
      Individual components:       
      Dependent R-squared F(5,76) Prob. Chi-sq(5) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.111055  1.898922  0.1044  9.106515  0.1049 
res2*res2  0.014488  0.223450  0.9513  1.187989  0.9460 
res2*res1  0.008373  0.128338  0.9855  0.686554  0.9837 
       
 
 
 
 
 
      VAR4 
     Included observations: 80 
   Joint test:     
   
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   
 40.19886 15  0.0004 
   
      Individual components:       
      Dependent R-squared F(5,74) Prob. Chi-sq(5) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.294012  6.163540  0.0001  23.52099  0.0003 
res2*res2  0.357597  8.238509  0.0000  28.60778  0.0000 
res2*res1  0.322139  7.033398  0.0000  25.77115  0.0001 
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Table 5. VAR1 with three lags 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
      Included observations: 81 after adjustments 
     Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
    
        VAR5 
        Included observations: 83 after adjustments 
Endogenous variables: s, f1           
 VAR1 S(-1) S(-2) S(-3) F1(-1) F1(-2) F1(-3) C 
S  0.942429 -0.555175  0.179190  0.185727  0.296368 -0.155019  0.500909 
   (0.17112)  (0.20720)  (0.18984)  (0.23584)  (0.23925)  (0.16205)  (0.23400) 
  [ 5.50727] [-2.67944] [ 0.94388] [ 0.78752] [ 1.23876] [-0.95661] [ 2.14063] 
F1  0.753399 -0.322122 -0.219049  0.327562  0.346549  0.100475  0.059922 
   (0.13286)  (0.16086)  (0.14739)  (0.18310)  (0.18574)  (0.12581)  (0.18167) 
  [ 5.67078] [-2.00246] [-1.48619] [ 1.78899] [ 1.86574] [ 0.79861] [ 0.32984] 
        
        
Equation R-squared 
Sum sq. 
residuals 
     
S  0.869485  1.308090 
     
        F1  0.932900  0.788459 
      
 
VAR Residual Normality Tests 
         Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl) 
        Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal 
       
            
VAR5 
           Included observations: 81 
          
           
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
Jarque-
Bera 
df Prob. 
                        
1  0.497449  3.340648 1  0.0676  3.507942  0.870767 1  0.3507  4.211415 2  0.1218 
2  0.281254  1.067900 1  0.3014  2.707926  0.287912 1  0.5916  1.355812 2  0.5077 
                        
Joint    4.408548 2  0.1103    1.158679 2  0.5603  5.567227 4  0.2339 
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VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
   VAR5 
  Included observations: 81 
 
   
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  1.967912  0.7417 
2  1.584890  0.8115 
3  1.978693  0.7397 
4  1.591504  0.8103 
5  6.051601  0.1953 
6  2.743446  0.6016 
7  6.915045  0.1404 
8  0.818416  0.9360 
9  1.900019  0.7541 
10  1.661554  0.7977 
 
 
VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests 
  Includes Cross Terms 
   
Null hypothesis: No  heteroskedasticity 
   
      
VAR5 
Included observations: 83 
    
Joint test:           
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   
 25.61065 81  0.0304 
   
      
Individual components:       
      
Dependent R-squared F(5,77) Prob. Chi-sq(5) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.387704  1.242943  0.2452  31.40403  0.2549 
res2*res2  0.428348  1.470877  0.1143  34.69615  0.1467 
res2*res1  0.415182  1.393575  0.1496  33.62977  0.1771 
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Table 6. Vector error correction estimation results 
a)       VECM1: Endogenous variables: s, f1 
    
        Vector Error Correction Esti-
mates             
  
      
  
  CointEq1 D(S(-1)) D(S(-2)) D(F1(-1)) D(F1(-2)) 
R-
squared 
Sum sq. 
Residuals 
D(S)  -0.490211  0.431214 -0.145343 -0.205985  0.118221  0.120161  1.332941 
   (0.26506)  (0.22451)  (0.18612)  (0.21709)  (0.15796) 
 
  
  [-1.84941] [ 1.92072] [-0.78093] [-0.94885] [ 0.74842]     
D(F1)  0.164698  0.587505  0.247445 -0.501250 -0.131347  0.362549  0.805950 
   (0.20611)  (0.17457)  (0.14472)  (0.16881)  (0.12283) 
 
  
  [ 0.79908] [ 3.36538] [ 1.70980] [-2.96939] [-1.06936]     
  
      
  
Cointegrating Eq:  
     
  
Included observations: 81 after adjustments 
   
  
  S(-1) F1(-1) C 
   
  
   1.000000  -0.867795  -0.625592 
   
  
  
 
 (0.03414) (0.15876) 
   
  
    [-25.4189] [3.94042]         
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b)       VECM2: Endogenous variables: s, f2 
    
        Vector Error Correction Esti-
mates           
  
      
  
  CointEq1 D(S(-1)) D(S(-2)) D(F2(-1)) D(F2(-2)) 
R-
squared 
Sum sq. 
Residuals 
D(S) -0.085083  0.176617 -0.172440 -0.085979  0.049242  0.075213  1.401036 
   (0.41156)  (0.38864)  (0.29457)  (0.30988)  (0.10927) 
 
  
  [-0.20674] [ 0.45445] [-0.58540] [-0.27746] [ 0.45066]     
D(F2)  0.631412  0.346651  0.192487 -0.218857 -0.060092  0.863725  0.234543 
   (0.16839)  (0.15901)  (0.12052)  (0.12679)  (0.04471) 
 
  
  [ 3.74971] [ 2.18001] [ 1.59710] [-1.72617] [-1.34414]     
  
      
  
Cointegrating Eq:  
     
  
Included observations: 81 after adjustments 
   
  
      
    
  
  S(-1) F1(-1) C 
   
  
   1.000000 -0.939974 -0.287367 
   
  
  
 
 (0.02333)  (0.10867) 
   
  
    [-40.2909] [-2.64448]         
 
 
c)       VECM3: Endogenous variables: s, f4 
    
        Vector Error Correction Esti-
mates           
  
      
  
  CointEq1 D(S(-1)) D(S(-2)) D(F4(-1)) D(F4(-2)) 
R-
squared 
Sum sq. 
Residuals 
D(S) -0.069414  0.193311 -0.117418 -0.204701  0.059667  0.083664  1.372627 
   (0.35610)  (0.32612)  (0.22885)  (0.25990)  (0.12676) 
 
  
  [-0.19493] [ 0.59276] [-0.51307] [-0.78762] [ 0.47070]     
D(F4)  0.828307  0.112713  0.077491 -0.189370 -0.058697  0.740717  0.372556 
   (0.18552)  (0.16990)  (0.11923)  (0.13540)  (0.06604) 
 
  
  [ 4.46478] [ 0.66340] [ 0.64994] [-1.39858] [-0.88881]     
  
      
  
Cointegrating Eq:  
     
  
Included observations: 80 after adjustments 
   
  
  S(-1) F1(-1) C 
   
  
   1.000000 -0.986891 -0.051364 
   
  
  
 
 (0.02149)  (0.10033) 
   
  
    [-45.9172] [-0.51196]         
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d)       VECM4: Endogenous variables: s, f8 
    
         Vector Error Correction Esti-
mates           
  
      
  
  CointEq1 D(S(-1)) D(S(-2)) D(F8(-1)) D(F8(-2)) 
R-
squared 
Sum sq. 
Residuals 
D(S)  0.160563 -0.089365 -0.318606  0.168734  0.059936  0.072903  1.351297 
   (0.26494)  (0.25523)  (0.21361)  (0.27088)  (0.19574) 
 
  
  [ 0.60604] [-0.35013] [-1.49152] [ 0.62290] [ 0.30620]     
D(F8)  0.507101  0.111959 -0.135063  0.010438  0.024550  0.306347  0.582649 
   (0.17397)  (0.16760)  (0.14027)  (0.17787)  (0.12853) 
 
  
  [ 2.91489] [ 0.66803] [-0.96291] [ 0.05868] [ 0.19100]     
  
      
  
Cointegrating Eq:  
     
  
Included observations: 78 after adjustments 
   
  
  S(-1) F1(-1) C 
   
  
   1.000000 -1.137689  0.652553 
   
  
  
 
 (0.04830)  (0.22551) 
   
  
    [-23.5532] [ 2.89372]         
 
 
 
 
Table 7. a) — b) VECM residual diagnostics 
 
a) VEC Residual Normality Tests 
           Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl) 
       Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal 
       
           
VECM1 
          
Included observations: 81 
        
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. Kurtosis Chi-sq df 
Jarque-
Bera df Prob. 
1  0.371712  1.865291 1  0.1720  3.479894  0.777258 1  2.642548 2  0.2668 
2  0.307847  1.279389 1  0.2580  2.802511  0.131631 1  1.411020 2  0.4939 
                      
Joint    3.144680 2  0.2076    0.908889 2  4.053569 4  0.3988 
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VECM2 
          
Included observations: 81 
        
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. Kurtosis Chi-sq df 
Jarque-
Bera df Prob. 
1  0.569311  4.375552 1  0.0365  3.973335  3.197414 1  7.572965 2  0.0227 
2  0.168357  0.382644 1  0.5362  5.423445  19.82166 1  20.20431 2  0.0000 
                      
Joint    4.758196 2  0.0926    23.01908 2  27.77727 4  0.0000 
 
 
 
 
          
          
VECM3 
          
Included observations: 80 
        
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. Kurtosis Chi-sq df 
Jarque-
Bera df Prob. 
1  0.600871  4.813951 1  0.0282  3.997690  3.317952 1  8.131903 2  0.0171 
2  0.229233  0.700635 1  0.4026  3.805174  2.161018 1  2.861652 2  0.2391 
                      
Joint    5.514585 2  0.0635    5.478970 2  10.99356 4  0.0266 
           
           
           
VECM4 
          
Included observations: 78 
        
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. Kurtosis Chi-sq df 
Jarque-
Bera df Prob. 
1  0.612520  4.877356 1  0.0272  4.081685  3.802639 1  8.679995 2  0.0130 
2 -0.165589  0.356454 1  0.5505  3.045044  0.006594 1  0.363048 2  0.8340 
                      
Joint    5.233810 2  0.0730    3.809233 2  9.043043 4  0.0600 
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b) VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
  
Probs from chi-square with 4 df. 
    
       
VECM1 
   
VECM2 
  
Included observations: 81 
 
Included observations: 81 
      
 
      
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  1.948143  0.7453 
 
1  2.983423  0.5606 
2  1.111183  0.8925 
 
2  1.306268  0.8603 
3  1.891608  0.7557 
 
3  2.706572  0.6081 
4  1.901664  0.7538 
 
4  2.294317  0.6818 
5  5.011756  0.2861 
 
5  4.140982  0.3873 
6  2.494129  0.6457 
 
6  2.030363  0.7302 
7  7.187861  0.1263 
 
7  2.866359  0.5804 
8  0.950381  0.9172 
 
8  2.340461  0.6734 
9  1.440915  0.8371 
 
9  3.017601  0.5549 
10  2.048120  0.7269 
 
10  8.590161  0.0722 
       
VECM3 
   
VECM4 
  
Included observations: 80 
 
Included observations: 78 
      
 
      
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  2.251241  0.6897 
 
1  2.879058  0.5783 
2  3.973815  0.4096 
 
2  1.301144  0.8612 
3  3.825397  0.4302 
 
3  5.260471  0.2616 
4  3.281709  0.5118 
 
4  2.304870  0.6799 
5  2.437999  0.6558 
 
5  4.699515  0.3195 
6  1.911466  0.7520 
 
6  2.903938  0.5740 
7  2.655346  0.6171 
 
7  3.583678  0.4653 
8  0.404134  0.9821 
 
8  2.218270  0.6957 
9  0.933887  0.9196 
 
9  1.975460  0.7403 
10  2.752765  0.6000 
 
10  3.542890  0.4714 
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c) VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity 
 
Tests: Includes Cross Terms 
   
      VECM1 
     
Included observations: 81 
   
      Joint test:     
   
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   
 80.48035 60  0.0400 
         
   
    
    
   Individual components:       
Dependent 
R-
squared F(20,60) Prob. 
Chi-
sq(20) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.320283  1.413603  0.1519  25.94294  0.1677 
res2*res2  0.332697  1.495712  0.1169  26.94849  0.1367 
res2*res1  0.308380  1.337642  0.1920  24.97878  0.2022 
            
      
      VECM2 
     Included observations: 81 
   
      Joint test:     
   
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   
 73.01032 60  0.1208 
         
   
    
       Individual components:       
Dependent 
R-
squared F(20,60) Prob. 
Chi-
sq(20) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.203736  0.767596  0.7395  16.50263  0.6850 
res2*res2  0.136975  0.476144  0.9661  11.09495  0.9437 
res2*res1  0.240624  0.950610  0.5303  19.49051  0.4902 
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VECM3 
     Included observations: 80 
   
      Joint test:     
   
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   
 57.24429 60  0.5771 
         
   
         Individual components:       
Dependent 
R-
squared F(20,59) Prob. 
Chi-
sq(20) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.181702  0.655043  0.8522  14.53616  0.8023 
res2*res2  0.186235  0.675126  0.8339  14.89881  0.7822 
res2*res1  0.180484  0.649685  0.8569  14.43870  0.8076 
            
      VECM4 
     Included observations: 78 
   
      Joint test:     
   
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   
 54.20467 60  0.6864 
         
   
         Individual components:       
Dependent 
R-
squared F(20,57) Prob. 
Chi-
sq(20) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.105048  0.334528  0.9956  8.193733  0.9905 
res2*res2  0.294496  1.189664  0.2965  22.97068  0.2902 
res2*res1  0.193301  0.682915  0.8260  15.07746  0.7720 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
